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GOVERNANCE METHODS USED IN EXTERNALIZING INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY
STEVEN KING-LUN CHAN
ABSTRACT
Information technology (IT) is the largest capital expenditure in many firms and is
an integral part of many organizations’ strategies. However, the benefits that each
company receives from its IT investments vary. One study by Weill (2004) found that the
top performer in the sample was estimated to have as high as a 40% greater return on its
IT investment than its competitors. To expedite the progress toward getting better value
from IT investments, along with the need to deal with the increasing complexity and
expense of IT, a growing number of companies are turning to outside service providers to
develop and/or manage various aspects of their information systems. The governance
methods used by firms to maintain control over the quality, services, and cost of IT
outsourcing are the focus of this dissertation.
Previously in the literature, researchers have looked into the phenomenon of
outsourcing from various perspectives. However, existing literature has not constructed
or proposed an outsourcing model that examines the important moderating impact of
internal technical capabilities to governance mechanisms. Building on existing literature
related to IT outsourcing, this dissertation examines governance mechanisms that were
used by firms to maintain control over the quality, services, and the cost of outsourcing of
IT in order to identify their contribution to the success of IT outsourcing initiatives from
the perspective of managers whose companies have engaged in IT outsourcing. In this
dissertation, a research model was developed, and through an on-line survey instrument,
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data were collected from the members of the Information Systems Community of
Practice in the Project Management Institute. The findings showed that the following
governance mechanisms had positive impact on managerial perceptions of IT outsourcing
success: (1) Financial commitment in the form of dedicated asset-specific investments;
and (2) attitudinal commitment. This study also confirms the moderation effect that firm
technological capabilities have on the relationship between managerial perception of
outsourcing success and attitudinal commitment, respectively. Additionally, this study
added to the literature in that it found that financial commitment and attitudinal
commitment impacts on future business are partially mediated by outsourcing success.
Based on the findings of this study, practical application and suggestion for future
research are offered.

5

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................4
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................8
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................9
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................10
1.1 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS VALUE TODAY ............................................... 12
1.2 STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE OF IT OUTSOURCING .................................................................. 14
1.2.1 Decisions Driving IT Outsourcing ............................................................................... 16
1.2.2 IT Outsourcing Benefits ............................................................................................... 18
1.2.3 IT Outsourcing Detriments .......................................................................................... 19
1.3 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISSERTATION .................................................................................. 21
LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................................24
2.1 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS ........................................................................................ 27
2.1.1 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND IT OUTSOURCING .............................................. 33
2.2 THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW .............................................................................................. 36
2.2.1 THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW AND IT OUTSOURCING ................................................... 39
2.2.2 THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW AND INTERNAL CAPABILITIES ........................................ 40
2.3 THE RELATIONAL VIEW ....................................................................................................... 44
2.3.1 THE RELATIONAL VIEW AND IT OUTSOURCING ............................................................ 47
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT..............................................................................................50
3.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 50
3.2 GOVERNANCE OF IT OUTSOURCING ..................................................................................... 51
3.2.1 Formal governance mechanisms .................................................................................. 53
3.2.2 Informal governance mechanisms ............................................................................... 55

6

3.3 MODERATING EFFECT OF INTERNAL TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY .................................... 61
RESEARCH METHODS ...........................................................................................................68
4.1 SAMPLE ............................................................................................................................... 68
4.2 DATA COLLECTION .............................................................................................................. 72
4.3 VARIABLES .......................................................................................................................... 73
4.3.1 Dependent Variable...................................................................................................... 73
4.3.2 Independent Variables.................................................................................................. 75
4.3.3 Control Variables ......................................................................................................... 78
4.3.4 Profile Variables .......................................................................................................... 79
4.4 HYPOTHESES TESTING ......................................................................................................... 79
EMPIRICAL RESULTS .............................................................................................................85
5.1 RESULTS .............................................................................................................................. 85
5.2 ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................ 95
5.3 DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................................... 99
5.4 LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................................ 106
REFERENCES .........................................................................................................................109
APPENDIX A OUTSOURCING TYPES ................................................................................150
APPENDIX B SURVEY INSTRUMENT ...............................................................................158
APPENDIX C RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY INFORMATION .....................................161

7

LIST OF TABLES

Tables
Page
I.
Dimensions and items of outsourcing success ………………..……………..... 73

II.

Results of the Harman’s single-factor analysis ……………………………….. 85

III.

Results of principal component analysis with all measures ……………………86

IV. Results of principal component analysis for outsourcing success ……………. 88
V.

Results of Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Root AVE .……………… 88

VI. Industry breakdown …………………………………………………………… 90
VII. Comparison between early responses and late responses……………………… 92
VIII. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations……………………………… 93
IX. Internal consistency calculation of each dependent and independent variables.. 94
X.

Results of hierarchical regression analysis for moderating effect …………...... 96

XI. Mediated regression results for effect of outsourcing success ………………

8

103

LIST OF FIGURES

Figures
Page
1.
Proposed model ……………………………..………………..……………....... 66

2.

Model with mediator effect ……………………………………………………. 103

9

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation focuses on strategic drivers related to managerial perceptions of
outsourcing success. It specifically assesses how formal and informal contracts—from
the underpinning theory of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)—interact with internal
and external technological capabilities—from the underpinning theory of the ResourceBased View (RBV)—and work together to impact managerial perceptions of outsourcing
success. It builds linkages by using the Relational View of interorganizational
cooperative strategies (Dyer & Singh, 1998) to bridge both the TCE and the RBV. Each
of these theories will be discussed extensively in Chapter 2, Literature Review.
The Information Technology (IT) industry was selected to demonstrate the
importance of these relationships because it readily provides rich, well-developed
theoretical and empirical support the outsourcing construct, and it also provides a
sophisticated arena in which to test the model developed for this dissertation. While TCE,
the RBV, and the Relational View are the main drivers of this dissertation, it is necessary
to first understand the main outsourcing issues central of the IT industry. Therefore, this
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dissertation begins with a discussion of outsourcing as it has been established in the IT
literature and then it moves to the potential impacts of its main theoretical drivers and
how they inform the research questions that this dissertation works to answer.
Information Technology (IT) was little known until the 1980s when personal
computers became more common in the workplace (Allen, 1999), after IBM introduced
its first personal computer in 1981 (Butler, 1998). Since then, corporations around the
world have now embraced IT as a vital and inseparable part of daily business operations
(Renkema, 1998; Sambamurthy, Bharadwa, & Grover, 2003). Mosner (2003) cited a
2001 survey done by the Department of Commerce and the National
Telecommunications Information Agency that found more than 57 percent of the U.S.
workforce was already using personal computers in their jobs. The U.S Census Bureau
also reported that 56 percent of U.S. working adults used a computer at work in 2003
(Day, 2005). By 2009, 76.7% of U.S. households had a computer (U.S. Census Bureau,
2011).
This impressive use of IT has led organizations to find ways to manage their IT
resources more cost-effectively and this had led to significant IT outsourcing, which has
led to costly problems in IT governance of IT contracts IT. Despite the number of studies
being published in the IT literature, little research has been done that actually measures
the impacts of formal and informal contract mechanisms (TCE) and use of
interorganizational resources (RBV and the Relational View) that might result in a better
IT services contract. The following subsections are devoted to IT as it is used herein and
its importance to businesses today.
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1.1

Information Technology and Business Value Today
Information technology (IT) was defined by the Architectural and Transportation

Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board) of the United States Government as:
“any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment,
that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management,
movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or
reception of data or information. The term “information technology” includes
computers, ancillary equipment, software, firmware and similar procedures,
services (including support services), and related resources” (Access Board,
2000, para. 7).

Nevo and Wade (2010) stated that IT has become an integral part of business
organization. Straub, Weill, and Schwaig (2007) also mentioned that IT was becoming
critical in an organization's success. This echoes Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1996), who
concluded that IT had increased productivity and created substantial value for consumers
even though they did not find evidence to indicate that these benefits resulted in higher
business profitability. They theorized that the lack of evidence in companies getting
higher profits from IT investments was because IT also lowered entry barriers for other
competitors, which caused more products to be available in the market. Therefore, the
prices that companies could charge for those products were reduced subsequently and this
impacted overall business profitability. Both productivity and profitability are constructs
commonly used by scholars when evaluating the business value of IT (Melville, Kraemer,
& Gurbaxani, 2004).
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Melville et al. (2004) defined IT business value as the “organizational
performance impacts of information technology at both the intermediate process level
and the organization-wide level, comprising both efficiency and competitive impacts” (p.
287). Based on their study of existing literature, Melville et al. (2004) summarized the
measurements of IT business value to include “productivity enhancement, profitability
improvement, cost reduction, competitive advantage, inventory reduction, and other
measures of performance” (p. 287). While researchers have not been able to attribute
definitively the impact of their IT investments on business performance (Kohli & Grover,
2008), many have found significant values of IT in business, and thus have classified it as
a strategic necessity (Nevo & Wade, 2010). For example, after analyzing data collected
for 36 monthly periods from eight hospitals, Devaraj and Kohli (2003) were able to
establish a direct linkage between technology usage and net revenue per patient. Melville
et al. (2004) also concluded that IT benefited business through increased flexibility and
quality improvement, but the extent of its impact was dependent upon other internal and
external factors.
With the rapid advancement of technology, many companies successfully have
integrated IT into their business models as a powerful way to foster growth, improve
interconnectivity among various business units, and to enhance their competitive
advantage in the marketplace (Nevo & Wade, 2010). However, the benefits that each
company receives from its IT investments do vary. One study by Weill (2004) found that
the top performer in the sample was estimated to have as high as a 40% greater return on
its IT investment than its competitors. Thus, from the literature, it is assumed that IT
investments in outsourcing provide inconsistent results, and therefore, it is necessary to
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better understand how those IT investments are governed, particularly in the outsourcing
arrangement.
1.2

Strategic Governance of IT Outsourcing
To realize better value from IT investments, many companies have turned to

outside sources for assistance and guidance, and thus a surge in IT outsourcing has
occurred (Wonseok, Gallivan, & Kim, 2006). This focus on externalizing IT services
through an outsourcing contract aligns with TCE and its market versus hierarchy
approach. From the TCE theoretical point of view, a corporation can be seen as a bundle
of transactions (Coase, 1937) that propels the company forward. Ever since it was
introduced by Coase (1937), TCE theory has been applied widely by scholars to explain
how organizations make strategic purchasing decisions. It explains that markets and
hierarchies are two alternative governance mechanisms (Coase, 1937), with the strict
definition of markets being those goods or services that are purchased externally to the
firm, and hierarchies being those goods or services that are developed inside the firm.
Choosing one or the other largely depends on the transaction costs that are involved in
these two options. Thus, outsourcing as used in this dissertation falls within the markettype of transaction from TCE.
As described by Simmonds and Gilmour (2005) and consistent with the TCE
market perspective (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), outsourcing is a practice that allows
organizations to transfer their service delivery to external vendors. Although the number
of outsourcing projects is increasing year after year and their potential benefits in many
areas (e.g. cost savings, higher return on investment, and allowing companies to focus on
their core competencies) are growing steadily (Martorelli, 2010), the promise of these

14

outsourcing providers to deliver added value remains somewhat unfulfilled (Willcocks,
Hindle, Feeny, & Lacity, 2004). Particularly, as Willcocks et al. (2004) noted, client
organizations frequently were not able to exploit vendors’ superior technical know-how,
mature management practice, and economies of scale.
The widespread adoption of IT outsourcing has emerged as an active research
area for scholars since 1990 (Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim & Jayatilaka, 2004). Among
existing literature, scholars define IT outsourcing very similarly. However, these
definitions vary because the propositions made by these authors are based on the purpose
of their research. According to Klepper (1995), IT outsourcing has been described as “the
provision of services by a vendor firm to a client” (p. 249). Loh and Venkatraman (1992)
defined IT outsourcing more specifically as “managing a firm’s IT infrastructure through
governance mechanisms with other firms” (p. 8). Two years later, Takac (1994) included
the ownership dimension in the definition of IT outsourcing by stating that it involved
transferring IT-related assets from service buyers to service providers so that service
providers could take over the responsibility for the outsourced IT activity. Altinkemer,
Chaturvedi, and Gulati (1994), who used the term information systems (IS) to reference
IT, defined IT outsourcing as the “act of subcontracting a part, or all, of an organization’s
IS work to external vendor(s), or manage on its behalf” (p. 252). For the purposes of this
research, I am adopting the definition from Altinkemer et al. (1994) because it includes
both IT-related services delivery and IT infrastructure management, which reflects
current business practices (Cha, Pingry, & Thatcher, 2009).
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1.2.1

Decisions Driving IT Outsourcing
IT outsourcing entails cultivation of an interorganizational relationship between

the client and the service provider, and thus, an inherently relational approach to the
provision of IT services (Lee, Miranda, & Kim, 2004). This interorganizational approach
is consistent with what Dyer and Singh (1989) term a Relational View. The Relational
View is aligned with the RBV, which is concerned with internal resources and
capabilities (Barney, 1991); however, it is distinct from the RBV in that it considers
resources to also be derived from an interorganizational dyad or network, which results in
a greater rent-earning potential for the resources (Dyer & Singh, 1989).
Several empirical studies have stated that outsourcing IT services to external
vendors will help companies achieve higher service performance with lower cost (e.g.
Duganier, 2005), and will allow corporations to gain competitive advantage (Johnston,
Abader, Brey, & Stander, 2009; Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995). Competitive advantage
occurs when a company acquires or develops a similar service or product as its
competition, but at a lower cost (cost advantage), or by delivering a superior service or
product than its competition (differentiation advantage) (Porter, 1985). These benefits
motivate top business executives to increasingly contract out their IT operations to
external service providers.
Recent literature on motivations for IT outsourcing suggests that outsourcing
decisions are propelled by several other reasons. Both McFarlan and Nolan (1995) and
Duganier (2005) stated that being able to obtain higher level of IT services at a lower cost
was the key decisive factor for companies to outsource their IT operations. While
acknowledging cost control was a key factor of IT outsourcing, Johnston et al. (2009)
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added that environmental uncertainty, the high cost of developing internal expertise, and
the ability to focus on companies’ core business functions are also important factors that
drive corporations’ outsourcing decisions. Kishor, Agrawal, and Rao (2004) indicated
commercial exploitation was another driver, especially for e-commerce projects.
IT outsourcing also has even been seen as a way to overcome internal politics to
achieve organizational outcomes (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995). Gartner (2005) has
pointed out another noticeable factor for companies pursuing outsourcing—once
personnel are freed from dealing with transaction-driven processes and tactical tasks, they
can then spend more time on work that delivers strategic value. In addition, the growing
technical complexity of IT and the substantial cost required to maintain a team of fulltime competent staff is prompting an increasing number of companies to rely on the
specialized expertise of outside service providers (Willcocks & Fenn, 2006). The level of
dependency is expected to increase as firms become more reliant on the knowledge and
motivation of external suppliers.
Depending on the nature of the outsourcing deals, the level of services offered by
outside IT providers can range from body shopping (Pattnaik, 2005) and short-term
consulting (Meyskens, Von Glinow, Werther, & Clarke, 2009) to selective outsourcing
and comprehensive outsourcing (Lacity et al., 1996). Appendix A provides a detailed
description of each of these outsourcing types. In this study, these outsourcing types are
assumed to be held constant because the study concentrates on the managerial
perceptions of outsourcing success given an outsourcing contract’s governance type
(driven by TCE), a firm’s internal technological capabilities (driven by the RBV), and the
desire to extrapolate more synergistic rents from interorganizational competitive

17

advantage (from the Relational View). The TCE, the RBV, and the Relational View will
be discussed further in Chapter 2, Literature Review. Because the outsourcing type of
contract was held constant, future work could include interactions between outsourcing
type and the model developed herein.
1.2.2

IT Outsourcing Benefits
Based on their observations of organizations that outsource their IT functions,

Lacity and Willcocks (2000) categorized the desired benefits in terms of six strategic
foci, namely financial position improvement, core competence, technology catalyst,
business transition, business innovation, and new market. These anticipated benefits may
appear individually or in combination over the outsourcing life cycle:
1.

Financial position improvement through enhancing a firm’s financial

position by reducing overall the costs of performing a business function.
2.

Core competence building through redirecting internal staff to focus on

tasks that are more strategic in nature to provide better value.
3.

Technology catalyst through bringing in external expertise to expedite the

company’s adoption of new technology.
4.

Business transition through employing vendors to assist with key changes.

5.

Business innovation through working toward business transformation and

improving skills and technology to achieve competitive advantage.
6.

New market development through using new sales channels to extend a

company’s product or services to a broader audience.
These perceived advantages could be seen as the key reasons that lead to large IT
outsourcing deals being announced so frequently (Cha et al., 2009).
During the first half of 2010, Forrester Research interviewed 54 companies that
have ongoing outsourcing projects worth at least $10 million each. With the average
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score being 4.33 out of 5, executives in these companies gave high marks for all 10
service delivery categories that Forrester tracked (Martorelli, 2010).
Even though the above-mentioned study shows that outsourcing projects are
performing better than before (Martorelli, 2010), success is not guaranteed. However,
Lacity and Willcocks (2000) found strong evidence that significant benefits can be gained
through IT outsourcing, and these benefits are not limited to financial improvements. Per
Claire et al. (2010) (processing efficiencies, quality improvements, plant scale flexibility
and quality) and Kakumanu and Portanova (2006) (core competency development), the
benefits derived from outsourcing help to align functional tactics with business strategy.
In doing this, companies can increase the probability of higher performance (Hayes &
Wheelwright, 1984). The Cao and Hoffman (2011) study also found that business
strategy and functional-tactic alignment had a positive effect on business performance.
1.2.3

IT Outsourcing Detriments
Despite some of the strong benefits of IT outsourcing, it also has significant

detriments. A 1995 paper published by the Standish Group found that the cancellation
rate for outsourcing projects was as high as 31.1%. The data suggested that over half of
the outsourcing projects would end up costing almost double what they were originally
estimated. Furthermore, there seemed to be a correlation between the failure rate and the
size of the buying companies (Standish Group, 1995). While, on average, 16.2% of the
software projects were completed on-time and on-budget, only 9% of the companies with
revenue greater than $500 million achieve that kind of success. Dun and Bradstreet
(2001) also reported that between 20–25% of large IT outsourcing projects failed within
two years, and an alarming 50% of these projects failed within five years.
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DiamondCluster International, a consulting firm that specialized in Internet-based
business development and telecommunications strategies, surveyed senior executives
from both service recipients and service providers annually between 2002 and 2006
(Thibodeau, 2006). Its 2005 study revealed that growing numbers of companies were
dissatisfied with their outsourcing vendors and struggled to realize full benefits from their
outsourced projects (Weakland, 2005). While only 21% of the survey participants in 2004
reported that they had abnormally terminated an outsourcing vendor or canceled an
outsourcing contract in the past twelve months, the number more than doubled to 51% in
2005 (Weakland, 2005) and 47% in 2006 (Thibodeau, 2006). These findings indicate that
there is room for improvement.
Although Martorelli (2010) found many benefits as discussed in the previous
section, the study also found that not all aspects of service delivery surveyed were getting
high praise. While vendors’ abilities to make a transformational impact in customers’
environments had the lowest score among the 10 categories, executives ranked the
vendor’s account management and governance skills just in the middle of these ten
categories. This certainly signals room for improvement in the IT governance area. (Note,
because governance can take many forms, the next section will review IT governance).
Top executives also listed expectation management with business buyers
(customers), effective knowledge transfer, and better goal alignment between outsourcers
and business buyers as some of the top challenges that they experience with outsourcing
partners (Martorelli, 2010). This latest finding echoes previous studies, which found that
buyers were not able to absorb and exploit knowledge from their service providers
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(Willcocks et al., 2004) and they struggled to realize the full benefit from their
outsourced projects (Weakland, 2005).
Although vendors are responsible for delivering business value to their customers,
Moore (2004) suggests purchasing companies need to share some of the burden before
they can enjoy full benefits from their outsourcing initiatives. Mismanagement, not being
able to solidify requirements, and bad-vendor and technology-selection procedures,
among others, are some of the key factors that contribute to negative outcomes for
outsourcing projects. Buyers have direct control over these elements (Moore, 2004).
Clearly, research on the results of IT outsourcing is mixed. This dissertation
intends to clarify parts of this issue by not only looking at benefits from cost, governance
type, financial commitment (asset specificity), commitment (attitudinal), and trust
(calculative), it also looks at the impact of technological capability on managerial
perceptions of outsourcing success and the possibility of future business.
1.3

The Purpose of this Dissertation
Previous researchers have studied the phenomenon of outsourcing from many

different perspectives, including the following:
1.

Impact on the firm from an economic perspective and from political or social
perspectives (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993);

2. A resource and skills perspective--among all essential business functions, IT is
considered as one of the areas requiring highly skilled employees and thus demands
significant amounts of resources (Loughry & Elms, 2006; Masters & Miles, 2002;
Teece, 1986);
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3. Key determinants of outsourcing (e.g., Loh and Venkatraman (1992) studied the
effect of strategic intent, project complexity, and technological maturity phase in
organizations’ e-commerce project sourcing decisions); and
4. Technical skills required as antecedents to outsourcing (Auber, Rivard, & Patry,
2004).
This dissertation enriches previous research in the subject of outsourcing by
investigating factors that can affect manager’s perception in IT outsourcing success. It
focuses on governance-mechanism contributions to successful IT outsourcing initiatives
from the perspective of managers who have overseen IT outsourcing engagements.
Robbins (2009) stated that perception “is a process by which individuals organise and
interpret their sensory impressions in order to give meaning to their environment”
(p.119). Robbins (2009) further indicated that “peoples’ behaviour is based on their
perception of what reality is, not on reality itself. The world as it is perceived is the world
that is behaviourally important” (p. 119). DeArmond, Huang, Chen, and Courtney (2010)
also mentioned that “individuals' attitudes or perceptions can influence their actions”
(p.4). This notion was confirmed by studies such as that by Ang and Straub (1998), which
concluded that perceived comparative advantages in production costs offered by vendors
had influenced executives’ decisions to outsource their IT functions. In the context of this
study, one can infer that a manager’s perception of an outsourcing outcome is an
important measure because this perception can impact a manager’s decision in future IT
outsourcing endeavors. The main focus of this dissertation will be the examination,
investigation, and analysis of governance mechanisms and their impact on success of IT
outsourcing, or more specifically, the formal and informal mechanisms that are
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theoretically driven, the internal resources required to support and enhance those
contractual governance mechanisms, and the interorganizational resources necessary to
achieve higher perceptions of satisfaction regarding the outsourcing arrangement.
By building on the existing knowledge base, this study contributes to the field of
strategic management by highlighting and examining the contributions of the need for
governance of critical resources, and the actual difficulties in managing a contract based
on knowledge wherein the skills of the individuals involved in any contract become a
critical resource for the outsourcing firm (per Dyer & Singh, 1989). In reviewing the
extant literature, this dissertation asks and studies the following questions:
1.

Given TCE, what is the impact of formal and informal mechanisms on
managerial perceptions of outsourcing success?

2. Given the RBV, what is the impact of internal technological capabilities on
managerial perceptions of outsourcing success?
3. How does the Relational View of interorganizational competitive advantage
help to bridge TCE and the RBV, and better inform managerial perceptions of
outsourcing success?
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CHAPTER II
Literature Review
There are competing as well as complementary theories regarding IT outsourcing
governance; among which, the TCE, and the RBV traditionally have been applied to an
organizational economics approach in the discipline of strategic management. To many
scholars, these theories are considered as part of the theoretical core of the management
discipline (Barney & Ouchi, 1986; Rumelt, Schendel & Teece, 1994). They have been
used in a number of articles on growing outsourcing practices in IT from various
perspectives, such as the determinants of sourcing decisions (Ang & Straub, 1998;
Kishore, Agrawal & Rao, 2004; Loh & Venkatraman, 1992), the importance of
maintaining internal capability (Willcocks & Feeny, 2006), and the relationship between
IT outsourcing strategy and outsourcing success (Lee, Miranda, & Kim, 2004). In the
following sections, these prominent theories are reviewed and their relevancy to this
empirical study is discussed.
Besides TCE and RBV, Agency Theory also has been used in some IT
outsourcing literature. Agency Theory traditionally is used to explain the principal-agent
issues that initially focused on the relationship between owners and managers (Berle &
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Means, 1932). Since the ground-breaking work done by Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Agency Theory has been used by scholars to explain phenomenon found in executive
compensation, employee management, and corporate governance, among others. It is
concerned with the agency relationship, which occurs every time an entity (the agent)
performs work on behalf of, or takes on responsibility from, another entity (the principal)
who owns the assets, in accordance with a mutually agreed contract (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While principals want their agents to work as hard as possible
for the compensation that they are paying their agents, Agency Theory argues that
employees are motivated to exert as little effort as possible for the rewards. Conflicts of
interest also have been shown to occur between managers and owners, in which owners
want to optimize their profits, but managers are more concerned about doing things that
will secure or even improve their jobs and status, such as acquisition or using corporate
assets for personal use (Galbraith, 1967; Williamson, 1964).
The separation of ownership and control and the conflict of interests between the
principal and agent are the underpinning focus of Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). However, neither of this occurs in typical IT outsourcing engagements. In a
typical IT outsourcing project, such as business process outsourcing (BPO) and custom
application development, the outsourcing companies (the principals) do not actually own
the tangible and intangible resources that their vendors (the agents) use to provide their
services. Because this study is concerned with IT outsourcing from the outsourcing
companies’ point of view, it will not make use of the Agency Theory and will focus on
demonstrating how the competing theories of TCE and the RBV explain the tension
between trying to manage the tremendous costs of IT and outsourcing contracts (using
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efficiency arguments from the TCE) and deriving value-added activities from an
outsourcing contract (using effectiveness arguments from the RBV).
Finally, the Relational View of interorganizational competitiveness (Dyer &
Singh, 1989) bridges the TCE and RBV, and notes that development of external networks
are a source of competitive advantage to those firms that learn to use those networks
successfully (Dyer, 1996). The typical short-term market interaction between and
outsourcer and outsourcee is being replaced by longer term vertical partnerships in which
both outsourcer and outsourcee collaborate greatly (Johnston & Lawrence, 1988), and
outsourcing relationships have become critical to organizational strategy (Dubini, 1997).
Given that critical functions have now been outsourced, Dyer and Singh (1998) identified
four potential sources of interorganizational competitive advantage as critical to
preserving relational rents, as follows:
1.

Relations-specific assets;

2. Knowledge-sharing routines;
3. Complementary resources; and
4. Effective governance.
These Relational View’s sources of competitive advantage clearly bridge TCE
and RBV, with relation-specific assets being similar to TCE’s asset-specificity,
knowledge-sharing routines being similar to the RBV’s knowledge sharing; and effective
governance being similar to TCE’s contributions to governance structure. The main
difference between the market perspective of TCE, the firm-level RBV, and the
Relational View is that both TCE and the RBV have the firm as the unit of analysis at
their core. The Relational View, has the interorganizational dyad or network as the unit of
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analysis at its core, and it specifically includes complementary resources between firms
in its paradigm.
2.1

Transaction Cost Economics
As noted in the introduction, The TCE views the corporation as a bundle of

transactions (Coase, 1937), and has been applied widely by scholars to explain how
organizations make strategic purchasing decisions. It explains that markets (strictly
speaking , external purchases) and hierarchies (strictly speaking, internal development)
are two alternative governance mechanisms (Coase, 1937). Choosing one or the other
largely depends on the transaction costs that are involved in these two options.
This idea gained further popularity after Williamson (1975, 1985) tested the
efficiency of these governance structures with measurable transaction dimensions, such
as asset specificity and transaction frequency. According to TCE, economizing is a basic
fundamental goal of any organization (Williamson, 1991). Additionally, all economic
activity revolves around different transactions that basically are some form of exchange
of goods or services between two or more economic partners. To optimize this type of
exchange, appropriate governance mechanisms must be matched to the nature of the
transaction (Williamson, 1985). Any company that fails to comprehend the cost
implications of their strategies may suffer inferior economic performance (Goerzen &
Beamish, 2005).
Williamson (1975) suggested that there are three key factors that determine
whether a company will keep transactions within its hierarchy or move them into
markets. Transactions, such as payroll processing, that are straightforward, repetitive
and do not require transaction-specific investments, will take place across a market
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interface. In this context, transaction-specific investments include money, time, or
energy that cannot be transferred easily. However, transactions that are high in
complexity, with high recurring frequency, or with “transaction-specific investments”
(also known as asset-specificities, which can lead to opportunism in the transaction
interface), are more likely to take place within hierarchically organized firms. This is
because the costs to construct, monitor, and enforce transactions (i.e., transaction costs)
in the latter scenarios often outweigh the market benefits if they are not being managed
well (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006).
According to TCE, bounded rationality and opportunism are two main causes of
contractual hazards. Bounded rationality as first introduced by Simon (1955), in part,
refers to the information asymmetry between actors and unknowns that often exists in
business transactions. Although a complex construct in and of itself, bounded rationality
is being used in this strict definition for this paper, particularly because of the information
asymmetry that can occur between contract participants. Because bounded rationality
cannot be eliminated, it is being treated as a constraining theoretical assumption within
the TCE perspective per Judge and Dooley (2006). This study will follow the same
assumption and treat bounded rationality as an inherent limitation. Furthermore, bounded
rationality implies that managers making the significant decisions surrounding IT
investments on outsourcing commitments do so without full knowledge of outcomes.
This would help to explain how managers might be satisfied with cost outcomes, but be
unsatisfied with effectiveness outcomes. This duality is important for this dissertation.
Opportunism refers to human nature in that actors may seek to serve their selfinterests rather than the best interests of their partners, when given the opportunity.
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According to Williamson (1975), opportunism “refers to a lack of candor or honesty in
transactions, to include self-interest seeking with guile.” (p. 9). Unfortunately, it is
difficult to know beforehand who will act opportunistically during the transaction and
who will not, which creates behavioral uncertainty (Williamson, 1985).
Contractual hazard (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), which includes issues such
as observability (Holmstrom, 1979), asset specificity (Williamson, 1985), and
appropriability (Pisano, 1990), can lead to greater possibility of opportunism (Mayer
& Salomon, 2006). Observability concerns the degree of monitoring that can be done
to confirm actions by actors (Holmstrom, 1979). As stated by Holmstrom (1979),
“full observation of actions is either impossible or prohibitively costly” (p. 74). The
higher the degree of difficulty in monitoring actions and measuring quality of results,
the higher the likelihood that a company will prefer using a hierarchical governance
approach instead of a market-based contract (Mayer & Salomon, 2006). Asset
specificity refers to the degree that assets can be deployed to alternative uses
(Williamson, 1985). The higher the degree of asset specificity, the lower the amount
of alternative uses of assets and the higher the possibility that vendors will act
opportunistically (Kvaloy, 2007). This was often referred to as the holdup problem
(Susarla, Subramanyam, & Karhadde, 2008). Lastly, appropriability describes the risk
of exposing a company’s intellectual property to expropriation (Pisano, 1990). Using a
company’s investment in research and development as an example, Pisano (1990)
explained that corporations would conduct projects internally to minimize the risk of
exposing their know-how to competitors.

29

Unlike bounded rationality, opportunism sometimes can be mitigated by
appropriate governance mechanisms that match the nature of the transaction (Das &
Teng, 2000). Misrepresentation of (Flinders, 2010), overcharging for (Pacheco, 2007),
and withholding information (Bielski, 2006), or withholding technology (Cannice, Chen,
& Daniels, 2003), are some opportunistic behaviors that one partner in a transaction may
exhibit. In 2010, the British High Court ruled that Electronic Data Systems (EDS), now a
unit of Hewlett-Packard (HP), misrepresented its capabilities when selling a Consumer
Relationship Management (CRM) system service project to British Sky Broadcasting
Group (BSkyB) (Flinders, 2010). It was reported that HP had agreed on June 7, 2010 to
pay a total of £318 million, valued at that time at US$ 461 million (XE, 2010), as part of
the final settlement of this legal case (Deans, 2010).
By deploying appropriate governance mechanism(s), one can reduce the
possibility of opportunism, but this also increases the cost of such a transaction (Kvaloy,
2007). And with uncertainty, more elaborate governance mechanisms to reduce
transaction costs effectively are needed because of the higher possibility of opportunism
and potential damages resulting from such opportunism. Therefore, companies will have
a competitive advantage if they can better manage the employment of such mechanisms
to minimize transaction costs derived from environmental uncertainty, asset specificity,
and the potential for opportunistic behavior, while effectively controlling such issues
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Through synergies, companies will be able to keep the extra
profits that their resources jointly generate (Becerra, 2008). This will in turn lead to
superior profitability for the firms. Becerra (2008) called this resource specificity or

30

“marginal contribution of resources being specific to the firm in which they are
employed” (p.1119).
When encountering a make-or-buy decision, TCE assumes that market
governance is preferable over hierarchical governance because of the free hand of the
market derived from higher competition in the marketplace. As suggested by Adam
Smith more than two centuries ago, society is somewhat self-regulated by the conjoined
forces of self-interest and competition. Competitive market forces will induce the supply
of goods and services that are desired by consumers at the costs that customers are
willing to pay (Mafi-Kreft, 2003).
Despite the higher costs of the initial search for the right partner and the
administrative burden needed to coordinate tasks across corporate boundaries, TCE
suggests that using market governance will make sense as long as the cost of a
transaction within the institution remains higher than the total cost of the same
transaction via open market exchange (Williamson, 1985; Saarinen & Vepsalainen,
1994). As mentioned earlier in this study, one key cost while using an open market
exchange is what TCE calls contractual hazard (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), caused
by issues such as imperfect measurement and asset specificity. From the TCE
perspective, companies should internalize transactions in the presence of contractual
hazards and employ external vendors to handle transactions when such hazards are
absent (Mayer & Salomon, 2006).
While TCE has suggested that the use of an appropriate governance structure
helps to safeguard against opportunism, TCE has been criticized for lacking in social and
relational aspects of the exchange (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006). Other scholars have
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also weighed in on this important topic. For example, Anderson and Dekker (2005)
suggested contract extensiveness, which is the extent both business partners engaging in
IT outsourcing project can foresee contingencies when designing contracts. This was said
to be one way to alleviate holdup by the other party (Susarla, Subramanyam, &
Karhadde, 2008). Informal governance addresses this issue by focusing on building a
long-lasting relationship between outsourcing companies and their service providers
through relational contracting (Granovetter, 1985), trust (Ness & Haugland, 2003), and
commitment (Goo, Kishore, Nam, Rao, & Song, 2007). Poppo and Zenger (2002) have
argued that legal contracts and relational governance complement each other in interorganizational exchanges. This view point was also echoed by Ryall and Sampson (2009)
and Goo, Kishore, Rao, & Nam (2008).
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2001) described the first of these forms—relational
contracts—as informal agreements that were sustained by the value of future business
opportunities. These added business opportunities were said to “reduce incentives for
opportunism in any given transaction” (Carson et al., 2006, p. 1058).
The second form of informal mechanisms is trust, which is comprised of
benevolent trust and calculative trust. Black (2008) defined benevolent trust as the extent
to which one party believes that the other party has intentions and motives that will
benefit both parties. Calculative trust is an ongoing, market-oriented economic evaluation
where each party assesses the benefits and costs to be derived from creating and
sustaining a relationship (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Ness and Haugland (2003)
concluded that benevolent trust and calculative trust can affect the development and
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expansion of inter-firm relationships. However, Jeffries and Reed (2000) theorized that
too much trust can also lead to satisficing and pareto-inferior solutions.
Lastly, the informal contract type of commitment indicated that one firm would
identify with its business partner(s) and, therefore, be committed to maintaining the
relationship to pursue the interests of both itself and its partner(s) (McGee & Ford, 1987).
Commitment was found to moderate the impact of service-level agreements (SLAs) on
outsourcing success (Goo, Huang, & Hart, 2008). One year later, Goo, Kishore, Rao, and
Nam (2009) empirically examined and confirmed that well-structured SLAs can also
“enable effective management of outsourcing engagements through the development of
partnership-style relationships with high levels of trust and commitment” (p. 120).
2.1.1

Transaction Cost Economics and IT Outsourcing
The evolving literature on IT outsourcing frequently has used TCE to help explain

its observations and predictions. As Willcocks and Lacity (1995) stated, several
academics such as Beath (1983), Klepper (1993), and Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) have
proposed that TCE provides a solid theoretical framework for describing and explaining
the IT outsourcing phenomenon. For example, by relying on TCE, Aubert, Rivard, and
Patry (2004) indicated that uncertainty and measuring problems are the major deterrents
to outsourcing, and the level of technical skills creates a positive relationship with the
company’s decision to outsource its IT functions. At the same time, business skills do not
seem to have a major impact on the IT outsourcing decision, which the authors believe is
because of relatively low level of business skills are required to conduct IT operations.
Lastly, this study finds that asset specificity renders inconsistent effects. While results
from the study’s first round of surveys suggests a positive relationship between asset
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specificity and outsourcing activities, which contradicts TCE, subsequent surveys using
both non-experts and experts, indicates opposite effects more congruent with expected
TCE results.
Among all the recent studies, the most common discussion is related to the
reasoning behind IT outsourcing, and many have focused on the economic determinants
of such business relationships (Ang & Straub, 1998). One of the key reasons cited is no
doubt the impression of cost savings that an open market can bring (Loh & Venkatraman,
1992). From this, TCE helps to predict whether a company will decide if it wants to
perform its IT functions in house or outsource them after comparing production costs of
internal operations to the total cost of fees required to pay vendors for the same IT
services in the marketplace, plus the transaction costs to manage such business exchanges
(Saarinen & Vepsalainen, 1994). Here, transaction costs refer to the resources including
human resources, tools, time, and financial outflow incurred in searching, creating,
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a service contract between buyers and suppliers
(Mahoney, 1992). Through their research on IT outsourcing contracts within the banking
industry, Ang and Straub (1998) have confirmed that perceived comparative advantages
in production costs offered by vendors do appear to influence executives to outsource
their IT functions, and increasing transaction costs do have a deterring effect on the IT
outsourcing decision.
Lacity and Hirschheim (1995) found that firm size also affects a company’s IT
outsourcing decisions. While IT service providers were perceived to be able to enjoy
economies of scale, which were referred to as lower average costs per unit , “due to mass
production efficiencies and labour specialization” (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995, p. 339),
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smaller organizations often have greater difficulty generating economies of scale in their
own IT operations. They further reported that this advantage enabled service providers to
offer their services at a lower cost than their customers’ internal IT departments, and they
confirmed a negative relationship between firm size and outsourcing decisions.
According to Mudambi and Tallman (2010), service providers achieve economies of
scale by applying “these processes to multiple clients, thus gaining scale efficiencies not
available to the potential outsourcing client. They also will experience learning effects in
applying these processes in more situations and to a wider range of applications than any
single client." (p. 1441).
TCE has been used to help explain another key research area in IT outsourcing:
the inter-firm cooperation or partnering relationship between the customer and the IT
vendors (Clemons & Row, 1992; Klepper, 1995). Particular interest was paid to the
variables that can improve the chance of a successful IT outsourcing relationship. For
example, Levinthal and Fichman (1988) suggested that the inter-firm relationship grows
over time, primarily through knowledge investments by the partner firms, and the trust
and increased ability to communicate resulting from relationships between personnel of
both parties. De Vita, Tekaya, and Wang (2010) also reported that service providers’
human and dedicated asset-specific investments contributed significantly to their
relationship with customers. The Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) model of partnership
development, which includes attraction, communication, bargaining power, and norms
and expectations, also was being suggested as beneficial in managing the development of
partnerships between customers and service vendors (Klepper, 1995).
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Many scholars have introduced guidelines for practitioners to conduct outsourcing
functions assessments (Lacity, Willcocks, & Deeny, 1996) and to manage outsourcing
engagements (Willcocks & Lacity, 1995), which have made real contributions to our
understanding of the IT outsourcing phenomenon. However, even though scholars were
able to use TCE to provide an explanation for some of the IT outsourcing phenomenon,
Willcocks and Lacity (1995) also asserted that they have found many residuals, which are
the experiences not explained by the theory and anomalies that actually contradict the
theory. In addition, though many scholars are treating TCE as a fully explanatory theory,
not many empirical tests have been done to validate its predictive power. Therefore,
Willcocks and Lacity (1995) have suggested scholars consider adding other established
theories in their studies to help increase the accuracy of their explanatory power. This
dissertation attempts to do so by combining TCE with the RBV and knowledge
management, as seen in the following sections.
2.2

The Resource-Based View
The RBV traditionally has been used to understand the unique factors that enable

organizations to gain and sustain competitive advantage (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993;
Barney, 1986, 1991; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). It is considered one of the most
widely accepted theories of strategic management (Newbert, 2007) because the RBV is at
the core of strategic management theory and has been used as a theoretical basis in
numerous studies (Berry-Stolzle & Altuntas, 2010). To find out the level of reliance upon
the RBV’s support in empirical literature, Scott Newbert performed a search of published
journal articles in ABI/Inform and EconLit and found that there were 1,152 articles with
"resource-based" or "RBV" in their titles, or abstracts (Newbert, 2007). After applying
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more filtering technique, such as looking for relevant keywords, and reading the abstracts
and the contents of those articles, Newbert (2007) identified 55 articles that are
substantively relevant to RBV. As these scholars indicate, not all resources under a
company’s control are important to the success of that company.
According to Barney (1991), firm resources include “all assets, capabilities,
organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc., controlled by a
firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its
efficiency and effectiveness” (p. 101). Barney (1991) proposed how resource value,
rareness, costly imitation, and strategic substitutes contributed to competitive advantage
under conditions of uncertainty.
Because of the management team’s intimate knowledge of the firm’s capabilities
and its internal processes, managers are considered one of the key resources of any
company as well. In fact, it was, Penrose (1959) whose work underpins the RBV and
whom suggested a potentially important causal link between top managements’
knowledge of the firm’s resources and capabilities and superior resource allocation
decisions.
Barney (1991) extended Penrose’s work to explain the impact of resource
heterogeneity on firm profits. Further extending the RBV, Teece et al. (1997) defined
dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and
external competences to address rapidly changing environments.” (p. 516). They used the
word dynamic to emphasis the need to exploit “existing internal and external firmspecific competences to address changing environments” (p. 510) because “certain
innovative responses are required when time-to-market and timing are critical” (p. 515).
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Winter (2003) elaborated on the concept of dynamic capabilities and introduced a term
called ordinary or 'zero-level' capabilities, which referred to “those that permit a firm to
'make a living' in the short term” (p. 991). Conversely, “capabilities that would change
the product, the production process, the scale, or the customers (markets) served” (p. 992)
are higher level capabilities.
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) referred to organizational capability as the ability of an
organization to perform a coordinated set of tasks and using organizational resources, for
the purpose of achieving a particular end result. Additionally, organizational capabilities
can be used to support production of a sequence of products or multiple products
concurrently (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000), which make them more valuable to the
companies that possess them. Kor and Mahoney (2005) also stated that intimate
knowledge of the firm and its organizational capabilities could be critical for effective
allocation of limited financial and human resources. The RBV suggests that managers’
firm-specific experience, involving tacit knowledge of a firm’s capabilities,
organizational routines, and business objectives, allows managers to make betterinformed decisions that are unique to each firm (Penrose, 1959).
This tacit knowledge is connected with problem solving (Polanyi, 1966), and
dependent on the interactions within multiple parties (Goffin & Koners, 2011).
Furthermore, tacit knowledge cannot be codified (Polanyi, 1962), which means that even
the knowledge owner is not able to construct the relevant information into a set of
identifiable rules and relationships that can be easily communicated (Kogut & Zander,
1992). Therefore, it has been suggested that tacit knowledge can best be expressed by
direct interaction and storytelling (Mascitelli, 2000). During outsourcing engagements,
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employees who are actively engaged in this process potentially can gain valuable
knowledge, including sourcing experience and efficient governance of the relationship
with the vendors (Espino-Rodríguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2006).
Through interactive learning, a company’s cross organizational boundary
capabilities can be further enhanced (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). The greater the
development of such capabilities, the higher the probability of them influencing
competitive advantage (Espino-Rodríguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2006). This type of
valuable knowledge is a positive knowledge spillover, and the buyer must protect and
promote its reuse and integration for its existing processes (Mayer, 2006) in order to have
a continued competitive advantage.
2.2.1

The Resource-Based View and IT Outsourcing
Similar to TCE, the RBV has been applied considerably in IT outsourcing

research. Many studies use the RBV to explain the determinants and extent of IT
outsourcing. Willcocks and Feeny (2006) acknowledged several studies employed RBV
to help explain contributions that IT can make to achieving competitive advantage.
Espino-Rodriguez and Padron-Robaina (2006) stated that “RBV helps to distinguish the
core competences and provides knowledge about which activities must be performed inhouse and which must be outsourced” (p.53). More specifically, Galanaki, Bourantas, and
Papalexandris (2008) applied RBV to develop a decision model to help companies
determine which, if any, of the training functions may be outsourced. According to
Espino-Rodriguez and Padron-Robaina (2006), a firm’s resources can be any production
factors that are available to that company. Each organization has different tendencies in
exploiting their resources, evaluating their values, and assembling them together in order
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to produce their final products or services (Han, Lee, & Seo, 2008). Han et al. (2008)
further stated that the ways in which performance can differ significantly depends on how
organizations orchestrate their resources together. Adopting appropriate IT governance
mechanisms was found to help companies reduce risk and establish ‘best practices’ in the
IT functions (Wessels & Loggerenberg, 2006).
2.2.2

The Resource-Based View and Internal Capabilities
It is well understood that knowledge is one of the scarce resources that can

explain, in part, differences in marketplace performance. Under the Knowledge-Based
View (KBV), knowledge is believed to be the key driver of competitive advantage and
firm scope (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). After analyzing data collected from
129 companies, Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien (2005) concluded that a firm’s IT
capabilities had contributed to firm performance. The study also found a causal
relationship between internal IT resources and IT capabilities, as well as a company’s IT
capability and its IT support for core competencies. These relationships illustrate the path
dependencies that companies have while using IT to complement and pursue their firm
strategies.
Besides ensuring their management teams have skills to manage IT outsourcing
engagements, companies must be sure that they have sufficient technical resources inhouse to be able to clearly articulate their expected outcomes from their outsourcing
initiatives and to develop precise measurements to track their progresses (Barthelemy,
2001). Furthermore, Mudambi and Tallman (2010) suggested that the "more knowledge a
company has in a particular field, the easier it is to manage inter-firm relationships and to
profit from external knowledge retention" (p. 1439). This observation is termed
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“connective capability”, which is one of the six knowledge capabilities that Lichtenthaler
and Lichtenthaler (2009) have identified as a critical capability responsible for managing
internal and external knowledge exploration, retention, and exploitation.
Customer organizations with a history of increasing efforts in developing
technological skills may gain in competitive advantage over their counterparts that do not
commit to internal resource development (Kor, 2001; Kor & Mahoney, 2005). According
to Itami (1987), corporate competencies are essentially information-based invisible
assets, which include management skills, and technological capability (Pucik, 1988).
Because competencies are embodied in employees within the organization, they represent
a type of tacit knowledge that is difficult to imitate (Teece, 1987). Tacit knowledge is a
type of knowledge that embeds in an individual’s personal experience and involves
intangible elements, such as personal belief and values, which make it difficult to be
articulated or codified (Polanyi, 1992; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).
As such, Itmai (1987) further suggested that accumulation of such invisible assets
could be seen as a foundation for sustainable competitive advantage. Twenty years later,
Kang, Morris, and Snell (2007) also reiterated that a firm's accumulated skills were the
foundation for its core competencies; the flow of that knowledge was the key enabler to
help it refine, and expand those critical skills.
One way that a corporation can accumulate competencies is through
organizational learning. Levitt and March (1988) defined four sources of organizational
learning:
1. Learning from direct experience: Corporations enrich their organizational experience
through either trial-and-error experimentation or through organizational search, which
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represents the approach in which organizations draw from a pool of alternative
routines and then adopt the better ones that they have discovered. The organization
learns by doing.
2. Interpretation of experience: Although causality of events is often ambiguous and is
subject to individual or group bias, organizations do form interpretations of events
and classify their outcomes as good or bad.
3. Organizational memory: “Rules, procedures, technologies, beliefs, and cultures are
conserved through systems of socialization and control. They are retrieved through
mechanisms of attention within a memory structure” (Levitt & March, 1988, p. 326).
The approaches that an organization uses to maintain and consult its organizational
memory structure has direct impact on how that organization reuses its experience
and sets its future path.
4. Learning from the experience of others: Organizations learn from other companies
through the transfer of encoded knowledge in the form of technologies, procedures, or
similar routines.
Although the first three sources could be adversely affected by outsourcing—
because the temporary nature of outsourcing weakens the traditions and routines
associated with a strong organizational culture (Pucik, 1988)—an organization can
enhance its competencies by learning from its outsourcing vendors. However, a firm’s
absorptive capacity for new information and knowledge is limited by its current
knowledge endowment (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) defined
absorptive capacity as the company’s ability “to recognize the value of new, external
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (p.128) and suggested that
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this ability was critical to a company’s innovative capabilities. Kor and Mahoney (2005)
also stated that a firm’s past investments in its technical skills could have continued
economic value in the present and in the future because these investments could help that
firm absorb new knowledge more efficiently. With strong internal technical forces
working with the vendors throughout the project lifecycle, customers will increase their
chance of learning relevant skills through the transactions. These inter-firm interactions
raise the customer firm’s possibility of reusing such knowledge in the future, which is
important for sustaining a competitive advantage (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009).
Recent RBV work promotes knowledge gathering and integration (Newbert,
2007), so that a company can increase its stock of a resource—in this case, knowledge—
and further its competitive advantage by using this new information as a catalyst for
transforming its existing knowledge (Mayer, 2006). At the very least, such knowledge
can be redeployed in a different area in order to extend the benefits that the knowledge
brings (Teece et al., 1997). Furthermore, keeping a sufficient level of internal IT
expertise will also help transferring the outsourced service to another service provider or
back to in-house at the end of the contract (Barthelemy, 2001).
In summary, the company’s internal technical capabilities (Lichtenthaler &
Lichtenthaler, 2009) and the experience of the company’s management team in handling
its outsourcing engagements and integrating these supplemental resources in the best
possible manner (Kor & Mahoney, 2005) are two of the key contributing factors that can
help determine whether companies can enjoy more benefits from their outsourcing
endeavors. This dissertation will investigate the relationship between each of these two
factors and the managerial perceptions of the outsourcing success.
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2.3

The Relational View
After studying the industry structure view and the RBV regarding the sources of

competitive advantage, Dyer and Singh (1998) argued that the sources of supernormal
returns may not be limited to those that are housed within the firm as suggested by those
two prominent views. Instead, “the (dis)advantages of an individual firm are often linked
to the (dis)advantages of the network of relationships in which the firm is embedded”
(Dyer & Singh, 1998, p.660). Haried and Ramamurthy (2009) also echoed that a firm’s
critical resources may span firm boundaries and may also be embedded in inter-firm
resources. Rather than using the firm as the primary unit of analysis, as proposed by both
the TCE and the RBV, the relational view of competitive advantage focused on using
dyad/network routine and processes as the unit of analysis. As indicated by Gulati,
Nohria, and Zaheer (2000), a network approach allows consideration of strategic benefits
from optimizing not just a single relationship but the firm’s entire network of
relationships. The Relational View of the firm suggests that a firm’s relationships with its
business trading partners are essential for understanding how it can achieve competitive
advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998).
The Relational View further argued that supernormal relational rents could be
generated when business partners combine, exchange, or invest in idiosyncratic
relationship-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, and complementary
resources/capabilities endowments. In addition, relational rents can also be realized when
business partners “employ effective governance mechanisms that lower transaction costs
or permit the realization of rents through the synergistic combination of assets,
knowledge, or capabilities” (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p. 662). Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer
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(2000) later added that this type of partnership building was not a one-time investment
and it indeed required continuous maintenance before it could flourish. In order to
maintain rent generation abilities, companies need to initiate necessary changes to the
partnership as it evolves while also managing partner expectations (Gulati, Nohria, &
Zaheer, 2000).
Since it was introduced by Dyer and Singh (1998), the Relational View has been
used in various research areas. Poppo and Zenger (2002) suggested relational norms, such
as trust, could be used as substitutes for complex, explicit contracts during market
exchange. Literature in economics and sociology has generally viewed relational
governance and formal contracts as substitutes (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Gulati (1995)
argued that the presence of one governance device could obviate the need for the other.
Furthermore, trust and reputation, as a form of self-enforcement could increase relational
rents because it could minimize transaction costs as compared to formal contracts (Dyer
& Singh, 1998). The Relational View has also been used to explain how firms chose their
preferred way to govern relationship with their outsourcing partners (Barthelemy, 2003).
Recently, the Relational View was used to explain the reason behind suggesting
companies in R&D intensive industries to take advantage of the complementing
resources of their partners (Mol, 2005). Dyer and Singh (1998) suggested that “firms who
combine resources in unique ways may realize an advantage over competing firms who
are unable or unwilling to do so” (p.661). The Relational View was also being used to
discuss the benefit of early supplier integration (Gassmann, 2006). Studies found that
suppliers could enhance the success of a firm’s innovation projects by contributing their
specific capabilities (Sobrero & Roberts, 2002). According to Hagedoorn (1993),
45

suppliers’ early involvement in the innovation process increases innovation performance
in most industries. The Relational View of setting up differentiated relationships with
suppliers early was said to allow companies enjoy significant benefit (Gassmann, 2006).
Samaddar and Kadiyala (2006) also used the Relational View to explore and confirm the
important of trust in governing inter-firm relationship in Korea. Data showed that
“Korean company is governed by a lesser degree of contractual completeness and more
by trust in its outsourcing relationship” (Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006, p.922). After
analyzing various complementary and, sometimes, contradictory theories that had been
used to ground the studies of the outsourcing phenomenon, Perunovic and Pedersen
(2007) associated those theories with different phases of the outsourcing process and
concluded that the Relational View was the only one that had been applied in all five
phases of the outsourcing process, which included preparation, vendor(s) selection,
transition, managing relationship, and reconsideration. Drawing on the Relational View
of the firm, Fink (2010) proposed a framework that identified four high-level dimensions
that corresponded to an organization's resource position in four key areas: organizational
IT value position, organizational IT asset position, relational asset position, and relational
capability position. Last year, Ndubisi (2011) reported that the Relational View had also
been utilized in studying the transition, managing relationship and reconsideration phases
of the inter-organizational relationship building process. It confirmed that selfenforcement did play a significant facilitating role in conflict handling between business
partners (Ndubisi, 2011).
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2.3.1

The Relational View and IT Outsourcing
Along with the RBV, the Relational View has been considered as one of the two

main paradigms in strategic management theories used to explain outsourcing (Chadee &
Raman, 2009). Since it was introduced by Dyer & Singh (1998), the Relational View has
been used in substantial IT outsourcing related literature to discuss the use of formal and
informal governance mechanisms in managing outsourcing relationship (Barthelemy,
2003); to prescribe ways to nurture rent-generating abilities from outsourcing partners
(Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000); to support the idea of keeping a small but active
suppliers network (Manhnke, Overby & Vang, 2005); and to explain how a selfenforcement governance mechanism was a preferred approach in handling inter-firm
relationships (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).
According to the Relational View, companies will outsource business functions if
relational rents can be generated from inter-organization knowledge sharing,
complementary resource endowments, or effective governance (Dyer and Singh, 1998).
Supernormal rents can be generated when partners invest in relation-specific assets and
companies will be more willing to outsource when these investments are likely to yield a
satisfactory return for all firms involved. However, the Relational View does not presume
that combinations of different firms’ resources alone will create competitive advantages.
Instead, relational rents will be created through the continuous successful evolvement of
the IT vendor - outsourcer relationship (Manhnke, Overby & Vang, 2005).
Due to the significant resources required to invest in relation-specific assets,
partner-specific absorptive capability, and in identifying partners with complementary
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resources that can be realized, the Relational View argues that firms can increase profits
by increasing their dependence on a smaller number of IT service providers (Manhnke,
Overby & Vang, 2005). With a limited amount of business partners, companies can focus
on communicating objectives, setting proper expectations, and building relationships to
promote risk and benefit sharing in order to develop a win-win situation for all parties
involved (Lee & Kim, 1999). Because partner-specific absorptive capability can be
enhanced when partners “get to know each other well enough to know what and where
critical expertise resides within each firm” (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p.665), a smaller
number of service providers will ensure outsourcers be able to devote sufficient resources
to build their relationships with their vendors. Furthermore, as Barthelemy (2003)
suggested, trust generally develops over the course of a relationship. Dyer and Ouchi
(1993) also stated that direct contact, such as through face-to-face meetings, was crucial
to developing trust between the client and the vendor. A large number of service
providers may dilute outsourcing companies’ abilities to develop mutual trust with their
business partners. Because the Relational View advocates the use of self-enforcement in
place of third-party enforcement, a smaller number of strategic service providers will be
more favorable in generating relational rents.
Scholars also used the Relational View to strengthen their discussions in specific
types of IT outsourcing projects. One of the potential sources of inter-organizational
competitive advantage is inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines, which were defined as
regular inter-firm interactions that permit the transfer, assimilate, or creation of
specialized knowledge (Dyer & Singh, 1998). This implies a mutual interdependence
between outsourcers and service providers to achieve an arrangement’s potential
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(Manhnke, Overby & Vang, 2005). Mahnke (2001) thus argued that this type of relational
rent-generating source might be more relevant for discussion in business process
outsourcing, where interfaces between components might be specified more fully, as
compared to infrastructure outsourcing arrangements. Studies also found support that
self-enforcement governance mechanisms, such as trust and reputation were suitable
complements of formal contract in outsourcing engagements. As suggested by Poppo &
Zenger, (2002), governance emerges from values and agreed-upon processes found in
social relationships that could minimize transaction costs as compared to formal
contracts.
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CHAPTER III
Hypothesis Development

3.1

Introduction
This chapter contains detailed discussions on key relationships in the model and

their associated hypotheses. The first section introduces the types of governance
mechanisms that are used in this study. The second section discusses how a firm’s
internal technological capabilities moderate the relationship between contract type and
outsourcing success.
Outsourcing success has been evaluated by other scholars through single item
measures such as satisfaction (Kim & Chung, 2003; Rouse & Corbitt, 2003), cost saving
(Karpathiou & Tanner, 1995; Lacity & Willcocks, 2001; Saunder, Gebelt, & Hu, 1997),
and vendor performance (Kern, 1999). Clearly, cost saving most frequently was used to
gauge outsourcing success. This coincides with the TCE perspective. For example, Lacity
and Willcoks (2001) reported that 53% of their survey respondents obtained cost saving
through IT outsourcing, which was 10 percentage points higher than another study done
by Rouse and Corbitt (2003). However, Rouse (2006) explained that “cost saving” itself
may not be sufficient in measuring outsourcing success. Rouse (2006) explained that
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“this measure fails to recognize that reduced costs accompanied by reduction in services
or quality are not necessarily valuable to an organization. Nor does it recognize that the
organization may be seeking alternative benefits, such as greater business flexibility, or
converting capital costs to expenses that may, in the short term, involve additional costs
to the firm” (p. 2). This juxtaposition of cost versus resource accumulation and use is at
the heart of the differing perspectives of TCE and the RBV and the trade-offs between
efficiency and effectiveness objectiveness.
Instead of assessing cost savings alone, Grover, Cheon, and Teng (1996) proposed
that outsourcing success should be evaluated from both technical (RBV) and economic
(TCE) perspectives. Besides the obvious economic benefit that many scholars have
already measured, Grover et al. (1996) also examined strategic benefits, specifically
measuring the degree that outsourcing helped customers refocus their core business and
enhanced their IT competence. Furthermore, this study also evaluated technical benefits,
which included how much outsourcing had impacted customers’ access to key
information technologies and how much outsourcing reduced the risk of customers
experiencing technological obsolescence. This study’s viewpoint of looking beyond the
economic dimension was also shared by other studies such as Karpathou and Tanner
(1995), Lee and Kim (1999), and Han, Lee, and Soe (2008). This dissertation adopts the
outsourcing success dimensions as measured by Grover et al. (1996), including strategic
(via strategic governance mechanisms), technical, and economic benefits.
3.2

Governance of IT Outsourcing
IT governance can be seen as the alignment of strategy and operations across

business and IT in support of business objectives. In fact, some authors agree that
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although strategy is important, without governance, it is impossible to achieve desired
results and thus, governance has an even bigger role in the success of outsourcing
ventures (Cohen & Young, 2006; Cullen & Willcocks, 2003). For example, Cohen and
Young (2006) indicated that “[effective] sourcing governance is more important to longterm sourcing success than any other factor” (p. 113). The rationale behind this belief is
that governance mechanisms set up rules and structure for good decisions to be made by
all parties involved without the need for continuous monitoring. Even if a company is
still in the process of developing a strategy, adequate governance can help that company
achieve positive outcomes from existing sourcing relationships and can help the company
keep its outsourcing projects under control.
Strategy researchers have long argued that achieving competitive advantage
depends upon a company’s ability to use existing stocks of resources rather than simply
having the resource. As Mahoney and Pandian (1992) stated, “A firm may achieve rents
not because it has better resources, but rather the firm’s distinctive competence involves
making better use of its resources” (p. 365). A company can appropriate extra returns
when it possesses the ability to integrate available resources (Becerra, 2008). Mahoney
and Pandian (1992) also suggested that the company’s ability to effectively evaluate the
strength and weakness of its resource position could result in a stronger basis for
competitive advantage. Being able to choose appropriate governance mechanisms for
each outsourcing scenario translates to a better use of limited resources, which often
means delivering a better result for the company than it otherwise can experience.
Depending upon the underlying philosophy of how the business exchanges are being
enforced, governance mechanisms can be grouped into two major categories, namely
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formal and informal (Behrens, 2006). The following sections discuss these two distinct
forms of governance mechanisms in detail.
3.2.1

Formal governance mechanisms
Formal mechanisms are those that can be codified by contract or explicitly

embodied within the regulatory framework of a relationship. They include depersonalized
exchanges, which are considered to be open market purchases (Williamson, 1991), as
well as “a reliance on financial parameters, and the drafting and implementation of
formal contracts” (Ferguson, Paulin, & Bergeron, 2005, p. 217), with the most frequently
analyzed mechanism being that of formal contracts (Jahner, Bohmann, & Krcmar, 2006).
However, even though formal contracts have been analyzed frequently by scholars,
Jahner et al. (2006) showed that they are not always useful as an explanatory variable
because of their consistency and widespread use. Additionally, some contracts have
proven to be both costly and inflexible for both parties (Gil, 2009), sometimes hampering
future adaptation.
A type of formal governance mechanisms includes financial commitment.
Williamson (1985) has stated that financial commitment is another approach that can help
reduce the incentive for opportunism. Yu, Liao, and Lin (2006) defined financial
commitment as any type of business ties involving commitments of financial resources.
Scholars such as De Vita et al. (2010) suggested that vendors’ financial commitment to
their engagements contributed positively to their relationship with their customers. As
such, mutual financial commitment between the outsourcer and the outsourcee should
have a positive effect on managerial perceptions of IT outsourcing performance.
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If one company has a financial commitment to a business arrangement, it likely
will have additional incentives to maintain relationships. Much literature has supported
the importance of financial commitment. According to Williamson (1985), financial
commitments may mitigate adversarial relationships between cooperative partners.
Zaheer and Venketraman (1995) also claim that financial commitments are similar to
hostage-taking in the sense that they are designed to eliminate opportunistic behavior. De
Vita et al. (2010) concluded that service providers’ dedicated asset-specific investments
contributed significantly to their relationship with their customers.
Yu, Liao, and Lin (2006) also believe that financial commitments are useful in
protecting unethical behavior and unchecked self-interest. From the perspective of the
Relational View, Dyer (1996) indicated that site-specific investments created physical
proximity, which provided interfirm cooperation and coordination. This increased
relational rents and thereby enhanced performance. The financial commitment also
"lengthens the 'shadow of the future' by signaling good-faith intentions and long-term
commitments" (Dyer, 1997, p. 548). Because of the additional incentives to maintain a
harmonistic relationship when customers have made a financial commitment into the
outsourcing projects, managers will be more willing to work with their vendors during
their outsourcing engagements. The outsourcing experience for purchasing managers will
also be further enhanced when their vendors do not exhibit opportunistic behavior
because those vendors have dedicated asset-specific investments in their projects and do
not want to jeopardize their relationship with their customers. Therefore:
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H1: Financial commitment in the form of dedicated asset-specific investments by
both the outsourcer and the outsourcee is positively related to managerial perceptions of
IT outsourcing success.
3.2.2

Informal governance mechanisms
Informal governance mechanisms include three general categories: trust, which is

composed of benevolent trust and calculative trust, commitment, and relational
contracting (Behrens, 2006; Goo, Kishore, Nam, Rao, & Song, 2007; Granovetter, 1985;
Yu, Liao, & Lin, 2006).
As stated by Ness and Haugland (2003) informal mechanisms of calculative trust
and benevolent trust can affect the development and expansion of inter-firm relationships,
and have strong impact on outsourcing success. Calculative trust has been defined
through the perception of trust as a form of economic exchange (Lewicki & Bunker,
1996). Individuals are assumed to be economically rational beings motivated by their
desire to maximize expected gains or minimize expected losses in their transactions
(Kramer, 1999). With that in mind, calculative trust is an ongoing, market-oriented
economic evaluation where each party assesses the benefits and costs to be derived from
creating and sustaining a relationship (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). As calculative trust is
being evaluated constantly throughout the partnership, initial trust between service
receiver and service provider is important to both parties in maintaining ongoing trust in
their relationship (Lee & Choi, 2011). Furthermore, Ali et al. (2007) found that cultural
understanding, communication strategies, contract conformance, and timely delivery
were also crucial in maintaining ongoing trust.
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Interviews conducted by Muehlberger (2005) indicated that the success of longer
term relationships was positively affected by calculative trust. Dyer and Singh (1998)
also stated that when business partners found creditable assurances that they would be
rewarded for staying within the partnership, they would be more likely to engage in
sharing tacit knowledge and unique resources. Further, calculative trust has been shown
to act as a moderating factor between formal governance mechanisms and transactionspecific investments and has a significant impact on single transaction outsourcing
relationships (Yu et al., 2006). Subsequently, Goo et al. (2007) developed a multi-level
model and indicated that change management and foundation characteristics contributed
positively and significantly to the development of calculative trust. Further, they found
that, as a governance mechanism, calculative trust contributed to managers’ perceived
success of IT outsourcing. Thus:
H2: Calculative trust is positively related to managerial perceptions of IT
outsourcing success.
In addition to calculative trust, benevolent trust also has been explored in the
literature. Behrens (2006) suggested benevolent trust could enhance outcomes in complex
outsourcing projects with high uncertainty. The main theme of Behrens’ (2006) study
was that perceptions of outsourcing outcomes was “a function of the congruence - or fit between the governance scheme employed to manage it and the characteristics of the
relationship's context" (Behrens, 2006, p. 108). For the outsourcing projects that have
high uncertainty and structural complexity, "the establishment of mutual trust and
relational norms between the outsourcing partners becomes crucial" to the success of
these engagements (Behrens, 2006, p. 111). Previous studies of interorganizational
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relations or networks have been able to show that trust can produce economic value
through the prevention of opportunistic behavior and incomplete contracting
(Muehlberger, 2005). McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer (2003) also suggested that trust has
positive effect on the performance of inter-organizational exchanges.
Black (2008) defined benevolent trust as the extent to which one party believes,
given the possibility of unforeseen conditions, that the other party has intentions and
motives that will benefit both parties. Larzelere and Huston (1980) asserted that mutual
trust could only exist to the extent that one party believes the other is benevolent and
honest. McAllister (1995) further explored the emotional aspect of benevolent trust and
stated that emotional ties between two parties could provide the basis for trust. Kiessling
and Harvey (2004) later added that the benevolent dimension of trust emphasizes the
motives and intentions of the outsourcing partner. This governance mechanism also
focuses on the qualities, intentions, and characteristics attributed to the other party as
opposed to specific behaviors (Ganesan, 1994). Since then, The results of an empirical
study on the impact of this construct has been mixed. After analyzing 115 valid responses
from their survey conducted with companies in mainland China, Tian, Lai, and Daniel
(2008) found that prior interactions with a service provider, the provider’s relationshipspecific investment, the provider’s information sharing, and the provider’s reputation are
key determinants of logistics users’ level of trust towards their third party providers. Ali
Babar, Verner, and Nguyen (2007) also identified that cultural understanding,
creditability, capabilities, and personal visits are important factors that customers
consider when they engage off-shore service providers. However, Yu, Liao, and Lin
(2006) did not find significant relationship between benevolent trust and transaction-
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specific investments. White (2005) also reported that benevolence was not a strong driver
on purchasing decision. Given these inconsistent results, and the high correlation between
benevolent trust and commitment discovered by other scholars such as Morgan and Hunt
(1994), this study will not include benevolent trust and will focus on the impact of
commitment to the managers’ perception of outsourcing success instead.
When investigating the determinants of IT outsourcing success, Goo et al. (2007)
found that commitment was one of the key components that contributed to that outcome.
Commitment has been defined as “an implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity
between exchange partners” (Dwyer et al., 1987, p. 13). It has further been specified,
similar to trust, as multidimensional, including calculative and attitudinal factors (Black,
2008). The calculative aspect relates to the extent to which one firm or organization is
bound to another firm or organization through extraneous interests as opposed to a
favorable disposition towards the organization (Srinivasan & Brush, 2006). Similar to
calculative trust, the rational aspect of cost-benefit analysis plays a significant role in the
formation of calculative commitment (Srinivasan & Brush, 2006).
On the other hand, attitudinal commitment indicated that one firm would identify
with its outsourcing partner(s) and therefore be committed to maintaining the relationship
to pursue the interests of both itself and its outsourcing partner(s) (McGee & Ford, 1987).
This governance mechanism can be defined as an affective attachment to the outcomes of
not only the initiating firm, but also the partner firm in the outsourcing relationship
(Allen & Meyer, 1990). Poppo and Zenger (2002) also suggested that IT outsourcing is a
good candidate for the use of commitment to help overcome the adaptive limits of formal
contracts. It further stressed that this type of relational governance mechanism “may help
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overcome the adaptive limits of contracts: a bilateral commitment to ‘keep-on-with-it’
despite the unexpected complications and conflicts” (Poppo & Zenger, 2002, p. 708).
Itami (1987) stated that commitment can help supplement formal contract in partnership
management because of the nature of having commitment, where two organizations
cooperate toward ambiguous outcomes that involve the exchange of invisible assets.
Drawing on the self-enforcement governance style of the Relational View, Ndbubisi
(2011) studied conflict handling typologies that affect trust and commitment in B2B
outsourcing relationship and found that commitment had significant impact on conflict
handling in outsourcing relationship. Thus:
H3: Attitudinal commitment is positively related to managerial perceptions of IT
outsourcing success.
Relational contracting focuses on cumulative contributions of individual business
transactions within larger economic and social interactions between firms (Granovetter,
1985). Instead of relying on third party intervention to deter opportunism, relational
contracting uses reputation (Gil, 2009; Larson, 1992; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988),
continuity (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006), and trust (Powell, 1990; Sako, 1991; Uzzi,
1997) to sustain the inter-organizational business transactions. However, relational
contracting is unlikely to serve sufficiently as a sole governance mechanism in the
outsourcing exchanges with external vendors. Instead, Poppo and Zenger (2002) have
argued that legal contracts and relational governance should complement each other
instead of replacing one another.
Poppo and Zenger (2002) observed that relational governance supported by
mutual trust was commonly viewed as a substitute for complex contracts in inter-
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organizational exchanges. They further discovered that governance, emerging from
values and agreed-upon processes found in social relationships, could be an effective way
of minimizing the transaction costs that a company might have to spend on more
elaborate contracts. By relying on relational governance, customers can reduce the risk of
inadequate contractual provision, which will in turn increase the chance of outsourcing
managers having better working experiences from their outsourcing projects. Thus,
informal governance mechanisms will have a positive effect on perceptions of IT
outsourcing performance.
With incomplete contracts, ex-post negotiations sometimes subject a company to
delays. For the previously mentioned scenarios, a sociological approach suggests that a
better tactic to combat such uncertainty depends less on extensive traditional contracting
and more on relational contracts to facilitate adaptation (Carson et al., 2006). Baker,
Gibbons, and Murphy (2001) described relational contracts as informal agreements that
were sustained by the value of future relationships. The Relational View also suggested
longer term relationships, as well as greater volume (scale) and breadth (scope) could
have positive effects on protecting business partners against opportunism (Dyer & Singh,
1998). Dyer (1997) found that suppliers for Japanese automakers with more specialized
suppliers group, such as Toyota, were more willing to invest heavily in relation-specific
assts. This type of automaker also enjoyed lower transactions costs than their competitors
with less specialized suppliers group. The expectation of long-term relationships, which
provided a longer payback period during which suppliers could earn a return on the
investments, was the reason provided that allowed automakers to “simultaneously
achieve the twin benefits of asset specialization and lower transaction costs" (Dyer, 1997,
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p. 552). Gil (2009) added that relational contracts “emphasize future cooperative
behavior, reciprocity, and mutual dependence” (p. 145). As part of the larger business
relationship, opportunism may be reduced because of possible spillovers from one bad
transaction to another. Similarly, some scholars also argued that relational contracting is
the most effective and least costly governance mechanism to manage a complex
exchange (Sako, 1991; Uzzi, 1997) because it helps reduce transaction costs incurred
through negotiation and monitoring efforts, thereby enhancing perceived performance
(Barney & Hansen, 1994; Sako, 1991).
H4: Relational contracts in the form of continuing possible future business
relationships are positively related to managerial perceptions of IT outsourcing success.
The above-mentioned formal and informal governance mechanisms are used in
the current study as independent variables for the first four hypotheses. The formal
mechanisms--financial commitments—were chosen for their consistency and frequent
use (Jahner et al., 2006; Williamson, 1985). The informal mechanisms—calculative trust,
attitudinal commitment, and possible future business relationships—were chosen because
of their previous widespread use in the literature and their relationships with other factor
variables, such as outsourcing experience (Leiblein & Miller, 2003).
3.3

Moderating Effect of Internal Technological Capability
As mentioned earlier, a company achieves sustainable competitive advantage

when it implements a value-creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by
any current or potential competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate
the benefits of this strategy within a foreseeable future. The RBV suggests that unique,
tangible resources and intangible resources and capabilities are the foundation for an
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organization to gain competitive advantages in the marketplace (Fahy, 2000; Grant,
1991). Furthermore, strategy researchers have argued that achieving sustained
competitive advantage depends upon the firm’s ability to use existing stocks of resources
(Grant, 1996), refine its existing knowledge stocks (Kang, Morris, & Snell, 2007), and
accumulate new resource stocks more efficiently and effectively relative to its
competitors (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). The RBV perceives the firm as a unique
bundle of idiosyncratic resources and capabilities. Any input that is either owned or
controlled by the company and that contributes to the production of goods and services
should be considered part of that firm’s resources (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). The
primary task of management is to maximize value through the optimal deployment of
existing resources and capabilities, while developing the firm's resource base for the
future (Grant, 1996).
In the case of outsourcing, the firm is moving a critical function out of the
organization because of cost considerations, per TCE; however, moving the entire
function out leaves the firm at risk because effectiveness may be lost, per the RBV.
Kor and Mahoney (2005) also stated that a firm’s past investments in its technical
skills could have continued economic value in the present and in the future because
these investments could help that firm absorb new knowledge more efficiently. Thus,
it is necessary for a firm to retain internal technological capabilities in order for it to
optimize its experience and enjoy more benefits from its outsourcing arrangement. It
can thus be deduced that a firm’s internal technological capability will moderate the
relationship between governance mechanisms and managerial perceptions of IT
outsourcing success.
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Knowledge asymmetry is known to be one of the potential drivers of
opportunism (Flinders, 2010); a more knowledgeable technical team can help in
narrowing the knowledge asymmetry between the outsourcing company and its venders.
Reducing knowledge asymmetry will enhance executives’ visibility of their outsourcing
initiatives, which can help them manage these projects better.
Furthermore, Arrow (1962) suggested that hands-on experience provided learning
opportunities that would enhance a firm’s production capabilities: “Such experientially
derived capabilities improve subsequent production along a given trajectory in terms of
both efficiency and technical performance” (Leiblein & Miller, 2003, p. 846). However,
outsourcing can reduce client’s learning-by-doing experience, which can have negative
impact on the client’s ability to integrate their IT activities into their business functions
(Cha, Pingry, & Thatcher, 2009). Experience with related technology has found to help
companies enjoy a slower knowledge decline rate when they outsource their IT functions
to their external venders because internal technical capabilities helped the outsourcing
client be better able to acquire a portion of its service provider’s relevant and useful
knowledge (Cha et al., 2009).
Lazonick and Prencipe (2005) found that an internal ability to strategically control
financial commitments is a necessary condition for innovation. In order to exercise
strategic control, companies must have a sufficient internal technological capability to
understand and execute their visions. By the same token, companies with sufficient
internal technical capability are more able to monitor and guide the usage of their
financial commitment for their outsourcing engagements. Technical expertise has been
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found to be an important factor that directly impacts the quality of one’s decision and
reduces the uncertainty linked to adverse selection (Ferrary, 2003).
However, in the case of asset-specific investments, these often are done by the
outsourcee, rather the outsourcer, per se. Thus, the direct effects on perception of the
outsourcer are less apparent. Being better at allocating and monitoring their outsourcee
partners’ asset-specific commitments may help companies to maintain control and to
mitigate potential risk, which in turn will enhance the perceptions of outsourcing success.
Because the impact of technological capabilities on the outsourcing manager’s perceived
outsourcing experience occurs indirectly through the outsourcee’s asset-specific
commitments, asset-specific commitments in this study are behaving as a moderator. (A
moderator is a qualitative or quantitative variable that affects the direction or strength of
the relation between a predictor variable and an outcome (Baron & Kenny, 1986). It
addresses “when” or “for whom” a predictor is more strongly related to an outcome
(Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). In some cases, it can be used to provide explanation of
unexpected weak or inconsistent relations between a predictor and an outcome (Baron &
Kenny, 1986)). Thus:
H5a: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between
asset-specific investments and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success.
Besides being able to better handle their financial commitments, companies with
higher technological capabilities are also in a better position to evaluate another party's
ability to meet their obligations (Doney & Cannon, 1997). Dyer and Singh (1998) also
suggested that firms with higher levels of expertise might “have a more precise view on
the kinds of partner/resource combination that allow them to generate supernormal
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returns” (p. 667). This critical information can help outsourcers weigh the costs and
benefits of staying with their vendors, which is the foundation of calculative trust.
Technical competence is said to be an important factor in the emergence of trust between
companies (Abrams, Cross, Lesser, & Levin, 2003). This is especially true during the
early stage of partnership, when ambiguities and uncertainties often exist (Kelly, Schaan,
& Joncas, 2002). In the context of employing formal governance mechanisms, Mayer and
Salomon (2006) suggested that companies with strong technological capabilities would
be better equipped to design outsourcing contracts with the right amount of detail,
including contingency planning and incentives. This helps companies to set proper
expectations and to avoid misunderstanding. They further stated that "Strong
technological capabilities may even help a firm craft better ex ante contracts to clearly
define the roles and responsibilities of each party, specify the knowledge to be
exchanged, identify appropriate milestones, stipulate monitoring mechanisms, and
introduce appropriate pecuniary incentives" (Mayer & Salomon, 2006, p.945). With
better contracts and monitoring mechanisms in place, outsourcing managers will feel
more at ease because they have better control via the ability to rely on relevant
contractual clauses in case their service providers do not behave in accordance to their
agreements. Thus:
H5b: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between
calculative trust and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success.
As mentioned previously, attitudinal commitment is the amount that the
outsourcing firm can identify with its services providers, which affects the degree that the
outsourcing firm will commit to maintaining the relationship. Because IT outsourcing
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service providers all are technology companies in nature, outsourcing companies with
higher technological capabilities will be able to relate to these partners better and will be
more willing to make attitudinal commitments to their relationships. This aligns with one
of the findings in the work by Gulati and Sytch (2008), who found that similarity
significantly enhanced the ability of exchange partners to translate this familiarity factor
“into a stock of trust” (p.165). Furthermore, outsourcers who possess higher
technological capabilities can reduce information asymmetries between business partners
(Ferrary, 2003). Because knowledge is accumulative (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), Dyer
and Singh (1998) stated that the ability to exploit outside sources of knowledge is largely
a function of the absorptive capacity of the outsourcer. Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler
(2009) also echoed that observation and suggested that the higher a company’s internal
technological capabilities are, the easier it is to learn relevant skills through exchanges
with service providers during outsourcing engagements, which is important for sustaining
a competitive advantage. Zahay and Handfield (2004) also indicated that learning
capability was an important asset that managers recognize as key to successful
deployment of relationship structuring, material flows, and information system
deployment. In the context of informal governance mechanisms, knowledge sharing
between service providers and outsourcing clients have been found to promote initial
trust and ongoing trust within the outsourcing relationship (Lee & Choi, 2011). In
addition, shared learning (a.k.a. team orientation) was also among the four organizational
learning dimensions that were found to have significant impact on relationship
commitment in the sourcing process (Zahay & Handfield, 2004). On the other hand,
insufficient technological capability can hinder the relationship building between two
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parties during outsourcing progress. For example, Dupont found that its inadequate
architecture planning capability had caused it to not being able to have informed
discussions with its vendors (Willcocks & Feeny, 2006). Therefore, it is hypothesized
that technological capability of an outsourcing company will affect the development of
attitudinal commitment, which in turn will impact the managerial perception of IT
outsourcing success.
H5c: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between
attitudinal commitment and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success.

Figure 1: Proposed Model
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CHAPTER IV
Research methods

4.1 Sample
The population for the current study is comprised of business professionals who
are members of the Information Systems Community of Practice in the Project
Management Institute (PMI). PMI is the world’s leading not-for-profit membership
association for the project management profession, with more than 600,000 members
(PMI, 2012a). In order to promote members’ interaction and to build the body of
knowledge in different industries and business areas, this organization has created 37
communities of practice in total for their members. Based on members’ own business foci
and interests, they are encouraged to participate in these communities. Information
Systems Community of Practice is a community that networks members who are
“interested in, working in, or impacted by developments in information systems project
management” (PMI, 2012b). Its community members are likely to have extensive
experience in the IT area and, thus, are an appropriate target for this study. In order for
the managers to qualify for the study, they had to have direct involvement in their
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organizations’ IT outsourcing initiatives. Through their direct involvement, these
professionals had to have first-hand knowledge of their outsourcing engagements.
4.1.1

Sampling plan
The sampling frame for the study was comprised of managers who had managed

IT outsourcing engagements in the past 24 months. When comparing results from a study
done by the Forrester Research in 2010 and similar studies done by DiamondCluster
International in 2005 and 2006, executives from the customer firms gave higher scores to
their IT outsourcing vendors in 2010 than in earlier years (Martorelli, 2010; Thibodeau,
2006; Weakland, 2005). This indicates users experiences in IT outsourcing engagements
may be changing over time. By limiting the research pool to the managers who had
managed IT outsourcing in the past 2 years, this study included data based on more recent
experience. Based on previous studies, control variables such as organizational size, and
revenue have not been found to affect outsourcing tactics (Grover, Cheon, & Teng,
1996). Therefore, this study did not control for these size variables.
For this study, the directory from the PMI Information Systems Community of
Practice was used as the base for potential subjects. Surveys were distributed via email to
all members of the Information Systems Community of Practices, whom are employed in
varying industries.
4.1.2

Sample size
Sample size of any study is an important consideration, as having a large enough

sample size makes it possible to generalize the target population, as well as have enough
statistical power to be confident of the results. Furthermore, insufficient sample size
reduces the likelihood of finding statistical significance. This increases the possibility of
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researchers making a Type II error, or failing to find statistical significance when it
actually exists (Balkin & Sheperis, 2011). For this current study, an “a priori” power
analysis is being used to determine the minimum sample size by using appropriate power,
effect size, and statistical significance. The power of the study is defined as the
probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis (Cohen, 1988). It "is considered [as] an
essential element in designing and evaluating quantitative findings for research" (Balkin
& Sheperis, 2011). In order to reject the null hypothesis, the power should be at least
0.80, which is the number that many researchers have used to ensure adequacy
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). Cohen (1988) suggested that the Type II error risk should
be four times as great as the Type I error risk to ensure adequate analyses, without having
to use unrealistically high sample sizes for social science research. Type I error refers to
the issue of stating a statistical relationship between dependent and independent variables
when one does not exist. Power levels lower than 0.80 will increase the chance of a
Type II error to greater than 20% and higher levels of power may suggest higher sample
sizes than necessary (Balkin & Sheperis, 2011). Therefore, Balkin and Sheperis (2011)
also stated that the recommended adequate power is 0.80.
Effect size is another essential element when calculating minimum sample size. It
is the desired magnitude or strength of relationship between the predictor and dependent
variables (Cohen, 1988). When determining the effect size, Cohen (1988) suggested three
different levels: small, medium, and large, which correspond to the correlation values of
0.10, 0.30, and 0.50 respectively. According to Cohen (1988), for the purpose of “a
priori” power analysis to determine a minimum sample size, the medium effect size is
appropriate.
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Lastly, the statistical significance criterion is the possibility of having a
substantial result when the null hypothesis is true. One of the most commonly used levels
of significance is 0.05. In this case, by adopting a power of 0.80, effect size of 0.30, and
level of significance equal to 0.05 through the power analysis performed using the
statistical G*Power software, the required sample size was calculated to be 64. Although
this may seem to be a small sample, it is statistically representative of larger samples and
was meant to serve as a base for developing further survey responses if necessary.
While “a priori” power analysis is conducted prior to the research study for
estimating sufficient sample sizes to achieve adequate power, post-hoc power analysis is
conducted after a study has been completed to determine the power that the obtained
sample size has provided. Scholars such as Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2004) have been
advocating the use of post hoc power analyses because it "would help researchers
determine whether low power threatens the internal validity of findings" (p. 204). Battle,
Cowan, and Rakow (2000) also stated that researchers should “give readers a clearer
picture of their findings by reporting the power post hoc.” For this study, a post hoc
power analysis was conducted using the statistical G*Power 3 tool, as Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, and Buchner (2007) suggested. Scholars including Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2004)
also credited G*Power as an “extremely useful” (p. 208) statistical software program that
conducts power analyses. By using the same effect size of 0.30 (medium effect), and the
level of significance to 0.05, the power of the observed sample size of 122 was calculated
to be 0.9078, which was higher than the widely accepted value of 0.80 (Balkin &
Sheperis, 2011). When running the post hoc power analysis with the effect size of 0.30,
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observed sample size of 122, and the level of significance at 0.01, the power was
calculated to 0.8022, which also reached the 0.80 threshold.
4.2

Data Collection
By following standard psychometric scale development procedures (Churchill

1979), a structured survey instrument has been developed after studying other scholarly
research with similar concepts to this one. This survey instrument contains existing
measures and customized questions that are relevant to the constructs of this study. A
two-step process has been implemented in order to enhance the content validity of this
survey instrument. First, an intensive literature review has been conducted to identify
valid measurements for the related constructs. Existing measures that have been
employed in other published studies are adopted as much as possible. Second, the
preliminary instrument was pre-tested by three managers with extensive experience in
managing outsourcing projects. Feedback from these reviewers have been incorporated
into the final version of the survey instrument. Appendix B shows the archetype of the
survey instrument for this study. As already noted, managers who had direct involvement
with IT outsourcing engagements were selected as individual participants because they
represented some of the most knowledgeable people regarding the overall outsourcing
experience of their organizations (Hambrick, 1981; Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980; Zajac &
Shortell, 1989).
Also noted earlier, the data-gathering procedure used email to solicit participation
in the study from business professionals who were members of the PMI Information
Systems Community of Practice. The solicitation explained the purpose of the study and
provided assurances of confidentiality for participants. A few days later, a separate email
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with the link to the survey instrument was emailed to these executives for completion. If
the completed questionnaire was not returned after one week, a reminder email was sent.
After one more week, a second reminder was sent to the subjects who had not yet
returned their questionnaires. A week later, the third reminder was sent to those who still
had not yet completed their survey. If the questionnaire was not returned four weeks after
it was sent, the participant was considered a non-respondent.
In this study, managers were distributed a survey instrument designed to measure
the outsourcing experience of the organization, as well as the governance mechanisms
that are employed by the firm. The raw survey data was captured and stored in the
database of the company that hosted the survey.
4.3

Variables

4.3.1

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is the IT managers’ perceptions of

outsourcing success. This variable is operationalized as a continuous variable that was
based on the results obtained from the nine-question survey instrument created by Grover
et al. (1996). See Table I for the Dimensions and Items of Outsourcing Success.
The survey instrument was based on questions where higher scores indicated that
the subject agreed more with the statements that expressed higher measurements for
outsourcing success. With the seven-point Likert scale used in the survey, the lowest
obtainable score would be one (meaning that the respondents selected “strongly disagree”
for all nine questions) and the highest obtainable score would be seven (meaning that the
respondent selected “strongly agree” for all nine questions).The responses to the nine
questions from Grover et al.’s instrument were added and averaged in order to provide an
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overall measurement of the outsourcing success of the organization. The higher the
observed average score the organization received, the higher was the outsourcing success
that the organization indicated.
Table I. Dimensions and Items of Outsourcing Success
(from Grover, Cheon, and Tang, 1996).
Dimension of
Outsourcing Success
Strategic benefits
Technical benefits
Economic benefits

Overall satisfaction

Item
(Strongly disagree, Strongly agree, 7 anchors)
We have been able to refocus on core business
We have enhanced our IT competence
We have increased access to key information technologies
We have reduced the risk of technological obsolescence
We have enhanced economies of scale in human resources
We have increased access to skilled personnel
We have enhanced economies of scale in technological resources
We have increased control of IT expenses
We are satisfied with our overall benefits from outsourcing

As previously explained, outsourcing success has been evaluated by other scholars
through single-item measures such as satisfaction (Kim & Chung, 2003; Rouse & Corbitt,
2003), cost saving (Karpathiou & Tanner, 1995; Lacity & Willcocks, 2001; Saunder,
Gebelt, & Hu, 1997), and vendor performance (Kern, 1999). However, a study done by
Grover, Cheon, and Teng (1996) was able to develop and assess a psychometric measure
of outsourcing success that involves three general types of benefits—strategic, technical,
and economic. Three years later, Grover et al.’s nine-item instrument of outsourcing
success was validated by Lee and Kim (1999), and Lee (2001), and was adopted by other
scholars such as Han et al. (2008) and Wang (2002). (Validity refers to the degree to
which an observed result of an instrument can be relied upon and not attributed to
random error within a sample. An independently validated instrument provides further
confidence that the results observed are indeed reflecting what the instrument is supposed
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to measure.) Content validity of the survey instrument previously was established
through the adoption of validated instruments by other researchers in the literature and by
the simple pretest conducted herein using three IT managers from different corporations.
To examine the internal consistency of measuring outsourcing success with the
Grover et al. (1996) instrument, Lee (2001) calculated Cronbach's alpha to validate the
reliability of the instrument. (Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient of reliability and can have
any value less than or equal to 1. A higher Cronbach’s alpha signifies higher reliability,
which is more desirable.) After evaluating 223 responses, the Cronbach’s alpha for
outsourcing success was calculated to 0.903 from the Lee (2001) study. Han et al. (2008)
also reported a 0.928 reliability level for the outsourcing success items. In addition, Lee
(2001) examined convergent validity (which refers to the degree to which multiple
attempts to measure the same concept are in agreement) by evaluating the correlation of
each item to the sum of the remaining items, this study found that all of the correlations
are significant at the 0.001 level and in the range of 0.582 and 0.720 (Lee, 2001).
4.3.2

Independent Variables
The independent variables in this study include both a formal contract mechanism

(financial commitment in the form of asset-specifity), and informal contract mechanisms
(calculative trust, attitudinal commitment, and future business relationship), as well as
technological capabilities of the company. Each of these will be discussed in the
following paragraphs.
Financial Commitment. A three-item measure developed by Tian, Lai, and
Daniel (2008) was used to capture the amount of financial commitment that customers
receive from their vendors. Tian et al. (2008) adapted this measure from Corsten and
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Kumar (2005) to identify a vendor’s willingness to dedicate relationship-specific
physical, process, and human assets sufficient to meet the current and long-term needs of
its logistics outsourcing customer. The construct reliability was accessed using the
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. The Cronbach’s alpha for this particular construct was
0.805, which was higher than the 0.700 threshold that was commonly being used as
acceptable reliability by other scholars (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). The Tian et al.
(2008) study also examined item reliability by means of factor loadings of the construct
items. With the factor loadings in the range of 0.832 and 0.841, these items were
confirmed to have adequate item reliability because their loadings were higher than
0.700, which was accepted as having sufficient item reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).
The same measure was customized to meet the context of this study and was used to
gauge relationship-specific investment from outsourcing service providers.
Calculative Trust. To measure calculative trust, this study used three items from
the N’Goala (2010) study that investigated long-term relationships between corporations
and their customers. Convergent validity of the three items that were used to measure this
construct was established because the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) was greater
than 0.50, which meant the variance of each construct was better explained by its
measures than by error (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). In addition, the N’Goala (2010)
study also used the Root AVE index to examine the discriminant validity of its survey
instrument. Its result showed that the Root AVE index of each construct was higher than
any other correlation with other latent variables, which confirmed discriminant validity
(N’Goala, 2010).
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Commitment. The survey instrument in Han et al. (2008) contained four items
that measure commitment. The Cronbach’s alpha for these measurements was 0.890,
which was higher than the 0.700 threshold. The AVE of this construct was 0.669, which
also was higher than the commonly accepted 0.500 threshold (Han et al., 2008). In
addition, Han et al. (2008) assessed discriminant validity by examining the square root of
AVE, and reported that the square root of AVE for each construct was greater than the
correlations between all other constructs.
Future Business Relationship. A 4-item measures used in the Carson, Madhok,
and Wu (2006) was being employed in this study. By using LISREL VII, the goodnessof-fit index (GFI), as well as Bentler and Bonett's (1980) delta statics all indicate
acceptable fit. Carson, Madhok and Wu (2006) also reported that reliability was
measured to 0.81, which exceeded the 0.60 guideline as suggested by Bagozzi and Yi
(1988).
Technological Capability. The survey instrument in Han et al. (2008) contained
three items that measure internal technological capability in terms of ability to integrate
IT and the ability to understand the trend of IT. The Cronbach’s alpha for the Han et al.
(2008) measurements was 0.902, which was higher than the 0.700 threshold. The AVE of
this construct was 0.570, which also was higher than the commonly accepted 0.500
threshold (Han et al., 2008). The square root of AVE for this construct was greater than
the correlations between all other constructs as well. All survey instruments for financial
commitment, calculative trust, attitudinal commitment, and technological capability are
included in Appendix B, Survey Instruments.
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4.3.3

Control Variables
This study included industry and managers’ outsourcing experience as control

variables in the analysis. Industry, measured by using the breakdown according to the
U.S. Census, might affect managers’ perception on the IT outsourcing success because
some industries have a longer history in IT outsourcing than others (Adelakun, 2004).
Recently, Volek (2012) reported an outsourcing maturity curve in 2011 that showed that
the insurance industry and the banking industry were both advanced in outsourcing
maturity when compared with other industries such as healthcare, and life sciences. This
finding echoed Ang and Straub (1998), who stated that the banking industry was an
industry with a long history of IT outsourcing. Following those breakdowns from the US
Census, the industries were listed as forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support;
mining; utilities; construction; manufacturing; wholesale trade; retail trade; transportation
or warehousing; information; finance or insurance; real estate or rental and leasing;
professional, scientific or technical services; management of companies or enterprises;
administration, support, waste management or remediation services; educational services;
health care or social assistance; arts, entertainment or recreation; accommodation or food
services; other services (except public administration); and unclassified establishments.
Furthermore, this study also controlled for managers’ outsourcing experience
using the three-item measures from Ho, Ang, and Straub (2003), which asked its
respondents to evaluate how well their service providers delivered what they promised in
terms of: meeting their deadlines; conducting key activities, such as application
development, software maintenance, or infrastructure support; and fulfilling their overall
obligations as stated in their Service Level Agreements (Ho et al., 2003). These questions
were used in this study to measures managers’ overall outsourcing experiences from their
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previous engagements. Research found that manager’s previous experience impacted
their perception of similar events in the future (Wang, 2010). After studying athletes’
perceived susceptibility to sports-related injury, Stephan, Deroche, Brewer, Caudroit, and
Le Scanff (2009) concluded that previous experience did impact athletes’ perception at a
later time. It stated that previous experience led people to believe that "if it happened in
the past, it can happen again" (Stephan et al., 2009, p.681). Cowley (2007) also reported
that consumers used previous experience as a proxy for their liking of later experiences.
It further stated that consumers were not consciously aware of the interfering effect of
previous experience and they did not realize their reliance on previous experience when
constructing memory (Cowley, 2007). This study thus controlled for industry and
managers’ outsourcing experience in order to extract possible confounding effects from
these variables.
4.3.4

Profile Variables
The research instrument for this study also contains several profile variables to

capture relevant information from the subject. Following Schwarz, Hirschheim,
Jayatilaka, and Goles (2009), the job title breakdown used in this study are manager,
director, EVP/vice President, CIO, CTO, COO, CEO, and others.
Appendix C provides detail reliability and validity information for all variables of
interest in this study,
4.4

Hypotheses Testing
The hypotheses for this study are:
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H1: Financial commitment in the form of dedicated asset-specific investments by
both the outsourcer and the outsourcee is positively related to managerial
perceptions of IT outsourcing success.
H2: Calculative trust is positively related to managerial perception of IT
outsourcing success.
H3: Attitudinal commitment is positively related to managerial perception of IT
outsourcing success.
H4: Relational contracts in the form of continuing possible future business
relationships are positively related to managerial perceptions of IT outsourcing
success.
H5a: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between
asset-specific investments and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success.
H5b: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between
calculative trust and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success.
H5c: A firm’s technological capabilities moderates the relationship between
attitudinal commitment and managerial perception of IT outsourcing success.
Multiple regression analyses were used to examine managerial perceptions of
outsourcing success with asset-specific commitment, future business relationship,
calculative trust, and attitudinal commitment. Multiple linear regression is a commonly
used method for exploratory data analysis (Craven & Stamper, 1972; Wheatley & Chiu,
1977). Through reviewing statistical means, this exploratory technique identifies the best
sub-set of independent variables from the overall set to include in a model (McIntyre,
Montgomery, Srinivasan, & Weitz, 1983). The relationship between the variables was
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assessed by examining the parameter estimate of each independent variable that was
included in the model. If the parameter estimate was found to be significant, this would
indicate that the independent variable did have an impact on the dependent variable
(Moore & McCabe, 2006), which in turn signified there was a positive or negative
relationship between the independent and dependent variables of the model.
In order to determine whether the parameter estimate was significantly different
from zero, an F-test is implemented on the parameter estimate. If the resulting test
statistic is found to exceed the critical value, then one would be able to conclude that the
independent variable is significantly related to the dependent variable. On the other hand,
if the resulting test statistic is not greater than the critical value, it would be considered to
be not significant (Mendenhall, Beaver, & Beaver, 1999). The critical value for the test
statistic in a linear regression model is determined by the level of significance and the
degrees of freedom for the given model. In general, the level of significance is 0.05
while the degrees of freedom for a regression model would be n – 2, where n is the
number of observations in the dataset (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). This test would allow
the researcher to determine whether the relationship was significant and to determine the
direction of the relationship.
To be able to address the direct relationship between each independent variable
and the dependent variable of this study, the following model was used:
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Ŷ = c+ X1β1 + X2β2 + X3β3 + X4β4 + e
where
Ŷ = outsourcing success,
c

= constant,

X1 = financial commitment in the form of dedicated asset-specific investments,
β1 = parameter estimate for the asset-specific investments,
X2 = calculative trust,
β2 = parameter estimate for the calculative trust,
X3 = attitudinal commitment,
β3 = parameter estimate for the attitudinal commitment,
X4 = relational contracts in the form of possible future business relationship,
β4 = parameter estimate for the possible future business relationship, and
e

= random error term with a mean of zero and a common variance σ2
(Keuhl, 2000).

The significance of the independent variable would be indicated in the estimate β.
If there was a significant positive coefficient, then this would indicate that as the scores
for the independent variables increase, the perception of a successful IT outsourcing
endeavor would also increase. Alternatively, if there was a significant negative
coefficient, then this would indicate that as the investment of the independent variables
increases, the perception of a successful IT outsourcing effort would gradually be
reduced. By using the linear regression model, the researcher would be able to determine
the perceived impact of using asset-specific investments, calculative trust, and attitudinal
commitment on managers’ perception on the success of IT outsourcing. This statistic
procedure was used to test hypothesis 1, 2, 3, and 4 because these hypotheses are
concerned with relationships between a dependent variable that was continuous and
independent variables that were continuous.
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For the remaining hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c, a statistical method used by Baron
and Kenny (1986) was used to assess the moderator effects of other independent
variables. In this method, the test for the moderator effect is to perform an analysis
similar to that of a multiple regression model. The idea behind this method was to find
out whether there is a significant interaction between the variables within the study
(Barron & Kenny, 1986). For hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c, the independent variables of
interest were the asset-specific investment, calculative trust, and attitudinal commitment.
The dependent variable was the perceived outsourcing success of the organization. In
order to determine whether internal technological capabilities provided a moderating
effect on the execution of the governance mechanism, the interactions between internal
technological capabilities and each of the three independent variables were included in
the model.
The model that is used for this assessment is:
Ŷ = c + X1β1 + X2β2 + X3β3 + X4β4 + X1X5β5 + X2X5β6 + X3X5β7 + e
where
Ŷ = outsourcing success,
c

= constant for this model,

X1 = financial commitment in the form of asset-specific investments,
β1 = parameter estimate for the asset-specific investments,
X2 = calculative trust,
β2 = parameter estimate for the calculative trust,
X3 = attitudinal commitment,
β3 = parameter estimate for the attitudinal commitment,
X4 = relational contracts in the form of possible future business relationship,
β4 = parameter estimate for the possible future business relationship,
X5 = buyer’s internal technological capabilities,
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X1X5 = interaction of the asset-specific investments and the buyer’s internal
technological capabilities,
β5 = parameter estimate for the interaction between the asset-specific
investments and the buyer’s internal technological capabilities,
X2 X5 = interaction between calculative trust and the buyer’s internal
technological capabilities,
β6 = parameter estimate for the interaction between the calculative trust and the
buyer’s internal technological capabilities,
X3 X5 = interaction between attitudinal commitment and the buyer’s internal
technological capabilities,
β7 = parameter estimate for the interaction between the attitudinal commitment
and the buyer’s internal technological capabilities, and
e = random error term with a mean of zero and a common variance σ2. Based
on the results of this final model, hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c were analyzed.
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CHAPTER V
Empirical Results

5.1

Results
As Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003) discussed in depth, the use

of subjective and retrospective self-report measures can raise a concern of having
common method bias in the collected data. Although collecting self reported data from a
single source at one time might yield unwanted correlations among data, conducting
survey using managers who had managed IT outsourcing projects was the only way to
gather relevant data for this study, such as manager’s perception of IT outsourcing
success. As stated by Parkhe (1993), conducting same source self reported measures may
be inevitable in some context. Furthermore, Lance, Dawson, Birkelbach, and Hoffman
(2010) reported that although common method variance did show an inflationary effect
on observed relationships, this effect was “almost completely offset by the attenuating
effect of measurement error” (p. 435). The Harman single-factor test (1967) argued that if
a substantial amount of common method variance exists, a single factor that accounts for
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most of the variance will emerge from the factor analysis when all of the variables are
entered together.
After forcing observed data into a single factor, results from the principal
component analysis shown in Table II indicated that this single factor only accounted for
35.023% of the variance. This signified that there was not a substantial amount of
common method variance present (Goo, Huang, & Hart, 2008). In order to ease the
concern of the common data source issue, testing for interaction effects of the constructs
was employed in this study, per Evans (1985).
Table II: Results of the Harman’s single-factor analysis.
Initial Eigenvalues
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Total
10.157
3.370
2.597
1.742
1.576
1.514
1.199
.949
.644
.624
.575
.471
.426
.404
.324
.296
.265
.253
.235
.215
.197
.181
.168
.132
.122

Variance %
35.023
11.621
8.955
6.008
5.436
5.221
4.133
3.274
2.222
2.152
1.983
1.623
1.470
1.394
1.118
1.021
.913
.872
.809
.740
.681
.624
.578
.455
.420

Cumulative
%
35.023
46.645
55.600
61.607
67.043
72.264
76.397
79.671
81.893
84.045
86.028
87.651
89.121
90.515
91.633
92.654
93.567
94.438
95.248
95.988
96.668
97.292
97.870
98.325
98.745
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Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Total
10.157

Variance
%
35.023

Cumulative
%
35.023

Initial Eigenvalues
Component
26
27
28
29

Total
.117
.093
.080
.073

Variance %
.404
.322
.277
.252

Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings

Cumulative
%
99.149
99.471
99.748
100.000

Total

Variance
%

Cumulative
%

Item validity was assessed by conducting principal component analysis with
varimax rotation. This technique was chosen because it allowed for interpretation of
relevant factors and the varimax rotation was also the most used rotation technique in
research (Norusis, 1993). Similar to the majority of researchers reported in Costello and
Osborne (2005), the Kaiser criterion (all factors with Eigenvalues greater than one) was
used to decide the number of factors to be retained for rotation. Table III provides the
results after suppressing the absolute value of the factor loading coefficient below 0.30,
which was considered to be having a small effect. The results generated seven
components with minimal cross loading for most measures.

Table III. Results of Principal Component Analysis for All Variables
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization

AssetSpecific
Investment

AI-1
AI-2
AI-3

Future
Business

FB-1
FB-2
FB-3
FB-4

Calculative
Trust

Survey Item

CT-1
CT-2
CT-3

1

Component
3
4
5

2

.333

.395
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7
.561
.803
.816

.729
.811
.697
.711

.355

6

.386
.770
.781
.900

.312

Manager
Experience

ME-1
ME-2
ME-3

Technological
Cap,

TC-1
TC-2
TC-3

Outsourcing Success

Attitudinal
Commitment

Survey Item
AC-1
AC-2
AC-3
AC-4

OS-1
OS-2
OS-3
OS-4
OS-5
OS-6
OS-7
OS-8
OS-9

1
.400

2
.784
.780
.785
.778

3

Component
4
5

6

7

.802
.810
.839

.325

.849
.849
.858
.364
.709
.803
.849
.873
.647
.690
.727
.468

.449
.345

.433
.361
.418
.630

.321

Because measures for outsourcing success had moderate cross loading on a
second component, a separate principal component analysis was conducted with just
these nine measures to confirm the number of components generated from these
measures. As shown in Table IV, a single component emerged from the measures for
outsourcing success.
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Table IV: Results of Principal Component Analysis for Outsourcing Success
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization
Outsourcing
Success
OS-1
OS-2
OS-3
OS-4
OS-5
OS-6
OS-7
OS-8
OS-9

Single
Component
.598
.806
.832
.760
.858
.826
.794
.841
.781

In order to evaluate convergent validity, the average variance extracted (AVE)
was calculated for each of the measures. As shown in Table V, the AVE measurement
values ranged from 0.5412 to 0.7259 while the commonly accepted threshold for
acceptable convergent validity is 0.5 (Han et al., 2008). This confirmed that the variance
of each construct was better explained by its measures than by error (Fornell & Larcher,
1981). Lastly, discriminant validity was assessed by examining the square root of the
AVE. The square root of the AVE for each construct as shown in Table V was greater
than the correlations between all other constructs, which confirmed the discriminant
validity of these measures.
Table V: Results of Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Root AVE
Variable
Asset-specific investments
Calculative trust
Attitudinal commitment
Future business
Manager experience
Technological capabilities
Outsourcing success

AVE
0.5412
0.6710
0.6111
0.5451
0.6677
0.7259
0.6270
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Root AVE
0.7356
0.8191
0.7817
0.7383
0.8171
0.8520
0.7918

The 841 members in the Information System Community of Practice in the
Project Management Institute were sampled for this study. As mentioned in Poppo and
Zenger (2002), response rates among IT executives usually are low. The 148 responses
received for this study represents a 17.60% response rate. Out of the 148 responses, 34 of
them were reported by service providers. Because this study was focused on management
from the outsourcing companies’ point of view, those responses from service providers
were not included in further analysis. Furthermore, because one of the responses did not
report whether it was from a customer or a service provider, it also was removed from
further analysis. In order to gather a more useful data set, this survey instrument was
purposely designed to allow respondents to provide input for up to three separate IT
outsourcing engagements. From all the responses, ten respondents provided data for their
second IT outsourcing project. However, because three of them were from service
providers, these three were not included in the final analysis either. Lastly, two other
respondents also provided data for their third IT outsourcing engagements. Therefore, the
additional effort of setting up the survey to gather information for more than one set of
data yielded nine more useful data sets for the final analysis. This addition was
significant when considering the initial count of 113 questionnaires received from
managers who purchased outsourced services. The final result set contains 122 completed
questionnaires, which was higher than the required sample size of 64 that was calculated
in the ‘a priori’ power analysis as started in the previous section.
The data collection yielded a heterogeneous sample covering a broad range of
industries and revealed no indication of systematic bias (Bode, Wagner, Petersen, &
Ellram, 2011). Table VI provides a detailed industry breakdown of the sample. Most of
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the respondents were managers with extensive IT outsourcing experience. On average,
the managers had 8.50 years (s.d. = 4.565) of IT outsourcing experience and had
managed on average 6.84 (s.d. = 6.184) IT outsourcing projects. In addition, 53.3 percent
of these individuals were in their current positions for at least 6 years.
Table VI: Industry Breakdown
Industry
Manufacturing
Professional, scientific or technical services
Finance or insurance
Health care or social assistance
Information
Transportaton or warehousing
Educational services
Utilities
Retail trade
Construction
Arts, entertainment or recreation
Mining
Management of companies or enterprises
Accommodation or food services
Others

Frequency
24
20
16
14
8
6
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
1
7

Percentage
19.8
16.5
13.2
11.6
6.6
5.0
5.0
4.1
3.3
2.5
2.5
1.7
1.7
0.8
5.8

Missing data often occurs in survey studies. This study also observed records with
missing data. A separate variance t test was conducted to identify variables with patterns
of missing values, which may be influencing this study. The results of this test showed
only six questions that had missing values and all six questions were related to internal
technological capability. Review of the dataset indicated that three questionnaires had
missing data in all six questions, while all other questions in these questionnaires had
data in them. This observation led to a belief that this missing data might have been
caused by computer error. The survey instrument was delivered to test subjects on-line
through web browsers. Questions representing each hypothesis were showing in different
web pages. After respondents finished answering one set of questions, they would need to
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click the Next button to forward to the next set of questions. It could be a computerrelated issue that caused the page containing questions related to internal technological
capability to not display to these users. Therefore, this missing data can be seen as
missing completely in random. While few statistically valid approaches exist in handling
missing data, the list-wise deletion approach to omit those cases with missing data and to
compute analyses on what remains is the most commonly used technique (Howell, 2009).
This study also employed the list-wise deletion approach when analyzing its data.
In addition to missing data, this study also took extra steps to estimate for
nonresponsive bias, which has been a concern of researchers who conduct questionnaire
survey since 1838 (Lambert & Harrington, 1990). Nonresponse bias refers to the
prejudice differences between the answers from respondents to a survey and the answers
that researchers might have received from those who did not respond in terms of
demographic or attitudinal variables (Sax, Gilmartin, & Bryant, 2003). Groves &
Peytcheva (2008) further explained that nonresponse bias is “a function of whether the
likelihood of survey participation is related to the variable underlying the estimate” (p.
169). Within a single survey, some estimates can be subject to large nonresponse biases,
while others can be subject to negligible biases. As Lambert and Harrington (2006)
stated, the “larger the bias, the more caution the researcher should exercise in
generalizing results of the respondent sample to the entire population” (p. 6). While
scholars have introduced a number of methods for estimating nonrepsonse bias,
extrapolations are considered to be those that lead to better outcomes (Armstrong &
Overton, 1977).
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To identify whether significant bias exists in this study, time trends extrapolation
were conducted. Responses from early-returned questionnaires and late-returned
questionnaires on a number of variables: industry, dedicated asset-specific investments,
future business relationship, calculative trust, attitudinal commitment, technical
capabilities, and managerial perception of outsourcing success, were compared. This
procedure was recommended by Armstrong and Overton (1997) and was adopted by
many scholars, such as Guthrie (2001), and Poppo and Zenger (2002). The assumption of
this analysis is that late respondents share similar characteristics and response biases as
nonrespondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1997; Guthrie, 2001). Analyses as shown in
Table VII indicate that there no significant mean differences existed between early and
late respondents.
Table VII: Comparison between Early Responders and Late Responses.
Variables

Early Responses

Late Responses

Dedicated asset-specific investments

4.1167

4.2022

Future business relationship

4.4057

4.4057

Calculative trust

3.9781

3.5738

Attitudinal commitment

5.4959

5.5164

Technological capabilities

5.0000

4.9836

Managerial perception of outsourcing success

4.8725

5.0333

Table VIII presents the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations
among independent variables. While results show that there was some correlation among
these variables, the magnitude of the observed correlations suggested that these variables
were not simply redundant measures, (i.e., the correlations range from 0.018 to 0.520 and
thus provide evidence of discriminant validity). There was moderate correlation between
dedicated asset-specific investments and possible future business. This indicated a higher
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tendency of partners investing financially into their relationship when there was a higher
possibility of future business prospects. Following procedures conducted by Tian et al.
(2008), discriminant validity was further assessed by examining the 95 percent
confidence intervals around all possible pair-wise construct correlations. Results showed
that the construct correlations range in value from 0.002 to 0.690. Because none of the
confidence intervals encompass 1.0; it suggested discriminant validity among the
constructs (Anderson, 1987).
Table VIII: Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations
Variable

Means

s.d.

AI

CT

Asset-specific investments (AI)
Calculative trust (CT)
Attitudinal Commitment (AC)
Future Business (FB)
Technological capabilities (TC)

4.159
3.776
5.506
4.405
4.991

1.588
1.481
1.145
1.457
1.140

1.000
.418**
.318**
.520**
.095

.202*
.420**
.018

.425**
.271**

.192*

1.121

.366**

.244**

.702**

.345**

4.952
Outsourcing success (OS)
n=119 – 121, * p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,

AC

FB

TC

OS

.181

1.000

In addition to the correlation between variables, multicollinearity is another
concern that researchers often assess. Multicollinearity occurs when there are high
correlations among the latent exogenous constructs (Grewal, Cote, & Baumgartner,
2004), which can provide redundant information about the response. High
multicollinearity can reduce reliability of the tested model (Blalock, 1963) and can cause
misleading results. For this study, variance inflation factors (VIF) were calculated for
each predictor. The result showed that VIFs were in the range of 1.169 and 2.644.
Because none of the values were higher than or equal to 10, which was the most
commonly used rule of thumb as a sign of severe or serious multicollinearity (O'Brien,
2007), it was concluded that there was no multicollinearity among these independent
variables.
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To examine the internal consistency of the variables being used in this study,
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were calculated for each of the variables. As stated by
Reynaldo, J. and Santos A. (1999), Cronbach’s alpha is appropriate for illustrating the
reliability of factors extracted from both dichotomous and scales variables. A split-half
analysis by calculating Spearman-Brown Coefficient was also performed. As shown in
Table IX, the Cronbach’s alpha values ranged from 0.735 to 0.924, with all higher than
the 0.7 threshold that is commonly considered as acceptable reliability (Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994). This indicated that all six variables do have acceptable reliability.
Table IX: Internal Consistency Calculation for Dependent
and Independent Variables
Variable

Cronbach’s alpha

Outsourcing success

0.924

Asset-specific investments

0.735

Calculative trust

0.835

Attitudinal commitment

0.908

Future business relationship

0.819

Technological capabilities

0.844

Managers’ outsourcing experience

0.865

Spearman-Brown
Coefficient
ELa:0.882
UL:0.883
EL:0.790
UL:0.805
EL: 0.874
UL: 0.885
EL: 0.923
UL: 0.923
EL:0.762
UL:0.762
EL: 0.814
UL: 0.829
EL: 0.912
UL: 0.921

Note: EL stands for Equal Length, UL stands for Unequal Length.

5.2

Analysis
Given that previous research has suggested that industries were known to be at

different maturity levels in terms of IT outsourcing (Adelakun, 2004), this study also
controlled for industry prior to examining the relationships of interest. Existing literature
also suggested that previous experience could affect perception of similar events in the
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future. Therefore, this also controlled managerial outsourcing experience prior to
examining the relationships of interest in order to extract possible confounding effects.
This procedure provided a stronger test of the theory developed in this study.
To examine the moderating effect of technological capabilities on the relationship
between the asset-specific commitment, calculative trust, and attitudinal commitment,
and managerial perception of outsourcing success, all independent variables were
centered before further calculation was conducted. This was done by creating a new
variable for each of the selected independent variables. The values of these variables
were calculated by subtracting the original value by its mean. These centered independent
variables were then multiplied by the moderator variable to create interaction variables.
Lastly, hierarchical regression was performed to determine a potential moderating effect.
In the first hierarchical regression model, only the control variables of industry
sector and managers’ outsourcing experience were included. In the second regression
model, the independent variables of asset-specific investments, calculative trust,
attitudinal commitment, and expectation of future business were added to the model.
Afterward, three sets of interaction variables were added to the third model. Following
Baron and Kenny (1986), a “moderator effect can be represented as an interaction
between a focal independent variable and a factor that specifies the appropriate
conditions for its operation” (p. 1,174). These interaction variables were the interaction
between technological capabilities and asset-specific investments, the interaction between
technological capabilities and calculative trust, and the interaction between technological
capabilities and attitudinal commitment. This step added the multiplicative product of
each pair of these variables into the third model in order to find out their impacts to the
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overall model. The result of this multiple regression is shown in Table X. All effects were
significant at the p < 0.01 level.
Table X: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Moderating Effects
Predictors of Managerial Perceptions of
Outsourcing Success
Model 1
Control Variables
Industry
-.131a (.451)b
Managerial experience
1.315 (.000)
Main Effects
Asset-specific investment (AI)
Calculative trust (CT)
Attitudinal commitment (AC)
Future business (FB)
Technological Capabilities (TC)
Moderator Effects
TC * AI
TC * CT
TC * AC
Predicted Model Results
F-value
18.621
R2
.248
Adjusted R2
.235
2
∆ Adjusted R
.235
Note: a Unstandardized regression coefficients (β), b p-value

Model 2

Model 3

-.028 (.845)
.480 (.023)

-.027 (.851)
.401 (.057)

.297 (.082)
.014 (.935)
1.224 (.000)
-.054 (.706)
-.023 (.911)

.273 (.104)
.244 (.199)
1.361 (.000)
-.134 (.347)
.056 (.781)
.036 (.411)
-.064 (.195)
.108 (.010)

17.323
.529
.498
.263

13.634
.565
.523
.025

Results showed that all models were statistically significant (p < .001). Model 1
indicated that control variables explained a portion of the variance (R2 = .248). Model 2
captured the factors that were hypothesized to have direct impact on managerial
perception of IT outsourcing performance.
When independent variables, asset-specific investments, calculative trust,
attitudinal commitment, and expectation of future business, were included in the model,
the variance explained increased significantly (∆R2 = .281, p < .001). This study first
asked whether financial commitment in the form of asset-specific investments is
positively related to the managerial perception of IT outsourcing success (H1). Following
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previous research, unstandardized regression estimates were used to evaluate the direct
relationship between variables (Bode, Wagner, Petersen, & Ellram, 2011). Results
showed that asset-specific investments did positively affect managerial perception (b =
273, p ≤ .01), which provided marginal empirical support for H1.
Next, the direct effect of calculative trust on managerial perception was analyzed
(H2). Results as shown in Table X indicate that calculative trust also are positively
related to managerial perception of outsourcing success (b = .244, p = .199). The
prediction of calculative trust indicated a direct and positive relationship, and thus,
managerial perception of outsourcing success is not supported. Attitudinal commitment
also was hypothesized to be positively related to managerial perception (H3). The results
showed that attitudinal commitment are positively related to managerial perception of IT
outsourcing success (b = 1.361, p < 0.001). Thus, the results provided empirical
supported for H3 as well. Lastly, the forth factor hypothesized to be positively related to
managerial perception of outsourcing success was the expectation of future business
relationships (H4). Contrary to the prediction, the results suggested a negative coefficient
for the expectation of future business (b = -.134). Therefore, the positive relationship
between expectation of future business and managerial perception of outsourcing success
was not supported.
Model 3 introduced the moderator effects of internal technological capabilities.
The inclusion of the interaction terms explained a small but highly significant additional
amount of variance (∆R2 = .036, p < .001). This study first addressed the moderator effect
of internal technological capabilities on the relationship between asset-specific
investments and managerial perception of outsourcing success (H5a). Results indicated
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that the internal capabilities and asset-specific investments interaction term was
significant (b = .036, p = .411). Thus, H5a was not supported. Next, the moderation effect
of internal technological capabilities on the relationship between calculative trust and
managerial perception of outsourcing success was evaluated (H5b). The results revealed
that the interaction effect of internal technological capabilities and calculative trust was
significant and in the negative direction (b = -.064, p = .195). Therefore, H5b was not
supported. Finally, the moderation effect of internal technological capabilities on the
relationship between attitudinal commitment and managerial perception of outsourcing
success (H5c) was evaluated. Results showed a positive and significant regression
coefficient for the technological capabilities and attitudinal commitment interaction term
(b = .108, p = .010). This provided empirical support to the H5c.
5.3

Discussion
The results of this study provide partial support for the hypotheses regarding the

directional linkages among the model variables. The data provided strong support for the
positive relationship between asset-specific investments and managerial perception of
management success; as well as a positive relationship between attitudinal commitment
and managerial perception of outsourcing success.
However, results also showed that the internal technological capabilities were
moderating the relationship between calculative trust and managerial perception of
outsourcing success in a negative direction, which contradicted the hypothesis in this
study. This was surprising, yet some literature also found this artifact. Cohen and
Levinthal (1990) mentioned that when employees shared specialized language, coding
scheme, or expertise, this technical strength “impedes the incorporation of outside

99

knowledge and results in the pathology of the not-invented-here (NIH) syndrome”
(p.133). Ridby and Zook (2002) also reported that two out of five executives surveyed
indicated that their companies suffered from the NIH syndrome (Katz & Allen, 1982).
This had impacted a company’s willingness to adopt external ideas and knowledge.
Furthermore, Hansen and Nohria (2004) indicated that the NIH syndrome was one of the
key barriers to collaboration. When a company had a strong internal technical team, it
might suffer the same syndrome, and not be open to external ideas or not fully cooperate
with external service providers (Bettencourt, Ostrom, Brown, & Roundtree, 2002). The
Relational View also stressed that business partners’ capabilities needed to be
complementary to each other in order to generate relational rents (Dyer & Singh, 1998).
Simply having higher technological capabilities might not be sufficient to help
outsourcers better enjoy knowledge sharing among business partners.
Conflicts between internal and external IT capabilities could diminish the overall
productivity of organizational IT (Nevo, Wade, & Cook, 2007, p. 6), which in turn
hindered the impact of an outsourcing project. Dyer and Singh (1998) further specified
that technological capability was just one of the two important factors that were required
for enhancing outsourcer’s partner-specific absorptive capability. Outsourcing companies
also need to develop interaction routines that maximize the frequency and intensity of
sociotechnical interaction before they can enjoy supernormal relational rents. In addition,
strong internal technological capabilities might enable companies to step in and complete
the project internally, in the event that their service providers were not performing as
expected, or threatening to walk away from a project (Mayer & Saloman, 2006). This
may impact managerial perceptions negatively regarding the benefits that they receive
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from their partners. External contractors also might not be able to receive legitimacy if
their knowledge and expertise did not differ substantially from that possessed by the inhouse IT team (Nevo et al., 2007). Furthermore, companies with strong internal
technological capabilities may be more likely to outsource functions that are repetitive
and non-strategic in nature. As suggested by Lacity and Willcocks (2000), one of the key
benefits of outsourcing is to be able to redirect internal staff to focus on tasks that are
more strategic in nature. Managers who oversaw IT outsourcing projects that were nonstrategic or less challenging than their internal projects might not value their service
providers’ contribution as much as if these projects were mission critical. Lastly, because
non-strategic outsourcing projects would likely not be as visible to upper management as
other critical initiatives, managers who handled these engagements might not appreciate
their partners as much. These factors could impact the outsourcing projects negatively
and might explain the negative moderation impact that the internal technology
capabilities had on the relationship between the calculative trust and managerial
perception of outsourcing success.
Another surprising finding was that the hypothesized positive relationship
between expected future business and managerial perception of outsourcing success was
not supported. Basic economics might provide an explanation in this case.
The most recent global recession has had a tremendous impact on companies
across the globe. As stated in Gregg and Wadsworth (2010), “the recession of 2008-2009
inflicted a larger cumulative loss of UK output than any of the other post-war recessions”
(p.61). While companies were going through their recovery process from this global
recession that started in 2008 (Sisko, Truffer, Smith, Keehan, Cylus, Poisal, Clemens, &
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Lizonitz, 2010), managers were having added pressures from constantly shrinking
budgets and from increasing demands on needing to get their expected rate of return from
their investments. Recession might also limit business partners’ abilities and willingness
to invest in relation-specific assets, which is considered as one of the key sources of interorganizational competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In addition, a challenging
economic outlook also could impact contract length negatively, which, according to the
Relational View, would also reduce partners’ willingness to invest in relation-specific
assets. Dyer and Singh (1998) stated that alliance partners needed to assess whether or
not they would be able to recoup the return on investment during the length of the
contract. Shortened contract duration might not allow sufficient time for cost recovery
and thus negatively impact such investments in the partnership. Bladen and Morrow
(2010) also reported that there were "severely diminished levels of engagement and
loyalty across industries" during the post-recession period. Furthermore, the shrinking
economy also heightened the competition among service providers (Liu & Nagurney,
2011). Customers often benefit from increasing vendor rivalry and needs of clients
(Michell & Fitzgerald, 1997) and thus the once-valued loyalty between customers and
their outsourcing partners might not be as important at this juncture. Therefore, the
expectation of possible future business relationship might not contribute to managers’
perception of outsourcing success as originally predicted in this study. Instead, Conley
(2003) reported that success could act as an antecedence of enhanced partnerships. Alford
(2011) also stated that experience of success increased people’s willingness to take on
further work. To test for whether manager’s perception of outsourcing success had any
significant impact to the expectation of future business, a mediator test was performed.
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Mediation is said to occur when a causal effect of independent variables on an
outcome is explained by an intervening variable. (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). According to
Thonis (2011), the conditions that need to be met when proving a mediation effect
include: (1) the relationship between independent variable(s) and mediator variable is
significant; (2) the relationship between the mediator variable and dependent variable(s)
is significant; (3) the relationship between the independent variable(s) and dependent
variable(s) is significant; and (4) the relationship between the independent variable(s) and
dependent variables is reduced when the mediator variable is being introduced into the
equation. After running hierarchical regression procedures in accordance with the Thonis
(2002) steps, asset-specific investments, calculative trust, attitudinal commitment, and
technological capabilities were significantly related to the managerial perception of IT
outsourcing (R2 = .561, p < 0.001), which satisfies condition 1. Results from regressing
managerial perception of outsourcing success and expected future business showed a
significant relationship (R2 = .111, p <0.01), which satisfies condition 2. Model 2 in
Table XI showed that independent variables were significant related to the managerial
perception of IT outsourcing (R2 = .565, p < 0.001), which satisfies condition 3. Lastly,
the model 3 in Table XI showed the adjusted R2 of .366 after the mediator variable was
added to the regression between the independent variables and dependent variable was
also lower than the prior adjusted R2 of .367. This satisfies condition 4. Because the
addition of the mediator variable only reduced, instead of fully eliminated, the
significance of the model, it thus indicated a partial mediation effect.
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Table XI: Post Hoc Analysis: Mediated Regression Results for
Effect of Outsourcing Success
Predictors of Managerial Perception of
Outsourcing Success
Control Variables
Industry
Managerial experience

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

-.081a (.485)b
.352 (.016)

.007 (.939)
-.169 (.235)

.006 (.953)
-.143 (.326)

.404 (.000)
.399 (.002)
.386 (.002)
.182 (.186)

-.143 (.000)
.411 (.001)
.469 (.002)
.184 (.182)

.014 (.649)
-.043 (.198)
.045 (.107)

.016 (.599)
-.047 (-.166)
.052 (.075)

8.398
.416
.367
.331

-.063 (.347)
7.639
.421
.366
-.001

Main Effects
Asset-specific investment (AI)
Calculative Trust (CT)
Attitudinal commitment (AC)
Technological Capabilities (TC)
Moderator Effects
TC * AI
TC * CT
TC * AC
Mediator from Post Hoc Analysis
Outsourcing success
F-value
3.149
R2
.053
Adjusted R2
.036
∆ Adjusted R2
.036
a
b
Unstandardized regression coefficients (β), p-value

Because outsourcing success acted as a partial mediator on future business, a new model based
on the finding was created (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Post Hoc Model with Outsourcing Success Mediating
Future Business Relationships.
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The findings of this study indicate that the dedicated asset-specific investments,
calculative trust, and attitudinal trust are positively related to managerial perceptions of
of outsourcing success. This further strengthens the observation that formal and informal
governance mechanisms do work in concert during IT outsourcing engagements (Poppo
& Zenger, 2002 TCE. This study contributes to previous research in that it highlights the
complementary explanation power that TCE and the RBV bring together in the arena of
IT outsourcing. In addition, the results of this study also contribute to the literature by
identifying specific types of trust that have higher correlation to managers’ perception of
outsourcing success, which have mixed findings in past research.
The partial mediating effect of outsourcing success on future business indicates
that, from a practitioner perspective, service providers who are interested in future client
relationships should ensure that their performance impacts managerial perceptions of
success because higher perception could lead to future business.
Furthermore, out of the few key governance mechanisms that this study has
examined, attitudinal commitment is the most important contributor to the outsourcing
success. This is consistent with observations by other studies, such as Ahmed and Salas
(2009) that stated that there is substantial evidence that in-group feelings have a
significant effect on individual behavior. This study contributes to practice by
highlighting the interconnectedness of governance mechanisms and outsourcing success.
An implication for practice is that purchasing companies should devote attention in
building trusting relationships and creating an environment to promote win-win situation
for both parties, particularly when faced with difficult financial turbulence. As suggested
in Obadia (2010), purchasing companies should communicate intensively about their
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actions to promote trust and long-term relationships in order to build up perceptions of
commitment from their partners. These perceptions will then in turn enhance the business
relationship among both parties and will benefit the outsourcing project in the end.
Lastly, the confirmed moderation effects that internal technological capabilities possess
also encourage outsourcing companies to continue devote sufficient resources to maintain
or even build up their own IT departments, while engaging their service providers to
handle some of their IT functions.
5.4

Limitations and Areas for Future Research
Several limitations of this study should be noted. First, because this study

gathered self-reported data from a single source at one time, common method variance
due to single-source bias could be a concern and might have inflated the magnitude of the
relationships found. Second, the relatively small datasets used for this study may limit the
ability to generalize its findings. Third, this study only focused on the managers from the
receiving end; future studies should investigate from the service providers’ point of view
to find out whether similar effects would be observed. Fourth, because no objective data
on each company’s outsourcing outcome was collected, it was not certain how well
managers’ perceptions align with their companies’ financial results. A comparative study
of managerial perception and financial impact is suggested.
Furthermore, Ahmed and Salas (2009) also suggested that trust and its impact
differs across cultures. As reported by TPI, a global IT sourcing advisory firm that tracks
larger IT deals worldwide, the IT outsourcing market in the United States only accounted
for 32.5% of the total $95 billion global contract values in 2011 (Maitra, 2012). During
that year, the EMEA market jumped 27 percent to $55.30 billion while the American
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continent market, on the other hand, contracted 20 percent to $31 billion (Maitra, 2012).
This shifting dynamic further highlights the important of studying this subject in
countries other than the United States to determine whether cultural differences will have
any significant impact to the governance mechanisms and the managers’ perception of
outsourcing success.
While IT is one of the key business functions that corporations have been
outsourcing to service providers, companies have been outsourcing business functions
such as engineering (Zirpoli & Becker, 2011), manufacturing (Bardhan & Kroll, 2003),
and R&D (Mol, 2005), to other business partners as well. R&D-intensive industries
traditionally have been seen as an impediment to outsourcing because these industries
usually have sufficient scale advantages to allow for vertical integration (Harrigan, 1985),
and the proprietary nature of R&D has increased the risk of opportunities (Williamson,
1985). However, the Relational View provided a contradictory viewpoint and suggested
that outsourcing should become more and more favorable in the context of R&Dintensive firms (Mol, 2005). According to the Relational View, the complementary intersector technological specialization will provide mutual benefits to both outsourcers and
vendors (Dyer & Singh, 1998). The increasing popular use of self-enforcement
governance mechanisms also promotes effective exchanges of technological know-how
among the outsourcing partners (Barthelemy, 2003). After empirically testing the 3-digit
level census data of Statistics Netherlands on 52 industries, Mol (1995) concluded that
"the relational view appears to be an appropriate portrait of empirical reality as it has
been developing" (p. 593). Scholars should look into the impact of governance
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mechanisms to the managers’ perception of outsourcing success in these transactions, as
well.
Lastly, the finding of this study indicate that managerial years of experience in IT
outsourcing had a significant effect on the impact of governance mechanism to
managerial perception of outsourcing success. Instead of looking at experience at the
individual level, Littlepage, Robison, and Reddington (1997) indicated that group
experience could also increase performance by facilitating recognition and utilization of
member expertise. Future studies should investigate the effect of experience from the
corporation level to find out whether that has even bigger impact than experience of
individual manager.
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APPENDIX A
OUTSOURCING TYPES

As mentioned in Chapter I, the following paragraphs describe the types of
outsourcing arrangements.
Body shopping refers to a common practice in which companies bring in
supplemental laborers from temporary employment agencies, such as Manpower, Inc., to
help take care of daily IT operations (Mastakar & Bowonder, 2005; Pattnaik, 2005).
While the U.S. economy is still improving, following its downturn in 2002 and again in
2008, many companies have opted for this approach to minimize the long-term
commitment in human resources expenditures. This practice also is what Lacity et al.
(1996) have referred to as one example of insourcing, in which companies bring in
external staff and resources and manage them under in-house administration. Although
temporary workers are not employees of the purchasing companies, they do take job
assignments directly from the purchasing company’s management. This approach allows
companies to retain control because they manage the assets, including labor power,
required to do the work (Brooks, 2006).
Body shopping often is used when companies possess sufficient internal skills to
manage those supplemental staff and monitor the work that they do. However, when it is
time to handle new initiatives for which companies lack internal expertise or they want to
preserve their internal staff for executing other tasks, companies can choose to engage
service providers in short-term consulting projects. These projects involve requesting
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their service providers to perform some clearly defined IT-related activities that will be
completed in one year or less (Cartus, 2010).
Short-term consulting refers to the practice of bringing in teams of professionals
on occasion to supplement staff shortages or skill gaps in order to complete some
predefined projects or assignments, such as application development or implementing a
new accounting system (Meyskens et al., 2009). The time duration for this type of
engagement is usually less than one year (Cartus, 2010; Petrovic, Harris & Brewster,
2000). In order to bring in fresh ideas, supplement skill gaps, and shorten time to
delivery, companies may outsource the design, development, or testing to outside
consultants. Typical projects in this area are designing and developing web sites for
internal employees or external customers and business partners and customizing business
applications (Meyskens et al., 2009). While short-term outsourcing engagements are
projects that can be defined clearly, evaluated, and completed within one year or less
(Petrovic et al. 2000), those projects that are more extensive in scope or have greater time
commitments can be termed as either selective outsourcing or comprehensive outsourcing
(Lacity et al., 1996).
Selective outsourcing is “the practice of outsourcing select IT applications to
vendors while retaining other IT applications in-house” (Lacity et al., 1996, p. 14). By
using this delivery model, selected IT functions, accounting for between 20–80% of the
IT budget, are being outsourced to external providers. Lacity and Willcocks (1998)
found that firms predominantly engage in selective outsourcing and are able to realize
greater cost savings than those that use short-term consulting engagements or
comprehensive levels of outsourcing. It should be noted that while the cost savings are
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better for selective outsourcing, lower costs resulting in increased efficiency may not
result in an increase in effectiveness. This dissertation differs from previous literature in
that it is designed to consider both costs and other associated benefits or detriments.
In selective outsourcing, the company signs a single contract with an external
service provider for the provision of all operations within a category of services, such as
the entire helpdesk support function (Cohen & Young, 2006). Commodity functions,
such as e-mail filtering, data centers, and disaster management, are also good candidates
for using this approach (Gibson, 2006). Transaction-intensive processes that are high in
volume, but add minimal value to the company, lend themselves to outsourcing as well
(Beulen, Baas, Dain, Hudson, Reitsma, Symonds, & Van Der Zee, 2004). One example
of such a process is payroll processing (Gibson, 2006). Furthermore, selective
outsourcing also is a preferred option for Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) contracts
when significant asset transfer and complex integrated processes are involved (Tyler,
2004).
Depending on the nature of services rendered, delivery models do vary (Gibson,
2006). They can be performed onsite, offsite (which could mean internationally), or a
combination of both (Beulen et al., 2004). For example, while an IT helpdesk call center
likely is to be operated offsite and increasingly operate offshore where costs are often
lower, desk-side IT support usually is handled onsite (Beulen et al., 2004). This option
provides the benefits of accessing technical skills, enjoying economies of scale, and
requiring less complex project management when compared to using multiple vendors.
However, because the purchasing company only deals with a single vendor, this approach
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potentially can limit the company’s exposure to the best-of-breed capabilities (Levina &
Su, 2008).
Comprehensive outsourcing is the classic outsourcing model that predominated
throughout the 1980s and most of 1990s (Lacity et al., 1996). Lacity et al. (1996) defines
comprehensive outsourcing as a practice that involves transfers from internal IT functions
to third-party vendors of IT assets, leases, staff, and management responsibility for
delivery of IT services, which account for at least 80% of the IT budget. A small
minority of companies adopt this IT outsourcing approach and form close partnerships
with their IT vendors. Some examples of these types of partnership including the Inland
Revenue and Electronic Data Systems (EDS) (Kern, Willcocks, & Van Heck, 2002), the
London Stock Exchange and Anderson Consulting (Clark, 2000), as well as British
Aerospace and CSC (Willcocks & Lacity, 1999).
Comprehensive outsourcing contracts often involve complex technical disciplines
such as the case in which the contracted service provider will act as a prime contractor
and tap into multiple providers for delivering the outsourced services (Capgemini, 2006).
While this practice of sub-contracting will help organizations gain best-of-breed
experience, it increases the risk that the prime contractor will fail to act effectively as the
project manager or liaison between service recipient and subcontractors.
Another variation of the service provider composition is that a company will
contract out its IT functions to a number of service providers, also known as multisourcing (Cohen & Young, 2006; Levina & Su, 2008). Either the customer or one of
these service providers will have the overall project management responsibility
throughout the outsourcing period.

153

In either of these arrangements—either simple or multi-sourcing—security issues,
liabilities, and possible higher transaction costs are considerations (Cohen & Young,
2006; Trent & Monczka, 2003). For example, General Motors Corporation (GM)
renewed two long-term contracts with Capgemini in June 2010. The combined 5-year
agreements were valued at approximately US$250 million, which replaced two of the six
previously signed 5-year mega-size multi-sourcing contracts that took effect in June 2006
(Capgemini, July 28, 2010). Three additional 5-year contracts valued at US$100 million
were later signed on December of the same year to extend three other existing contracts.
Previously in 2006, as part of a continuous outsourcing effort, GM awarded six vendors
approximately $7.5 billion worth of IT work over a five-year period. Among these six
vendors, Capgemini was charged to manage application development and integration
across the automaker’s business units and, on an enterprise-wide basis, to ensure that all
the work follows GM’s standard (Capgemini, 2006). Under this arrangement, Gapgemini
also was charged to manage other vendors who were selected to do some of the
application development projects (Schaffhauser, 2007). This included monitoring other
service providers to ensure they adhere to GM standard, which range from common
technology standards to processes for system verification, validation and project
management (Mitchell, 2006). During an interview, Ralph Szygenda, who was the chief
information officer and group vice president of GM, told a reporter that GM outsourced
most of its IT operations, but had maintained 2,000 employees to handle "strategic
management of information technology” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 1). He believed making
suppliers adhere to a similar set of standards created a win-win for all parties involved.
Szygenda explained "You take all of the mundane IT processes that really aren't
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innovation for GM or the IT company and make all that simple," (Mitchell, 2006).
Furthermore, Szgenda said implementing a single set of operating standards would allow
GM to improve global collaboration, while assuring reliability of its computing systems
and cutting costs. "It lets GM focus on innovation rather than spending a lot of time on
managing its suppliers." he said at a press conference (Hamm, 2006). In addition, it was
reported that the significant cost savings through its multi-sourcing arrangement allowed
GM to reduce its annual IT budget from US$4 billion in 2000 to approximately US$2
billion in 2010 (Reid, 2009).
In a comprehensive outsourcing environment, service providers are responsible
for all aspects of the IT infrastructure that they are charged to handle, including server
center, network, security, system administration, application development, and
maintenance (Lacity et al., 1996). This approach works better for medium- to large-sized
corporations because they can command service providers’ attention when service-related
issues surface (Mitchell, 2006). However, smaller organizations probably do not have
the same purchasing power to demand a similar amount of responsiveness from their
vendors, especially when dealing with large service providers. Under this arrangement,
the selected service provider usually controls the IT operation that was once controlled by
the customer (Lacity et al., 1996). Depending on the nature of the outsourced operation,
the staff of the services provider may work on the same premises as the employees of the
clients (Lacity et al., 1996) or they may work off-site or offshore while performing their
functions (Herath & Kishore, 2009). A few multi-national corporations, such as General
Electric (Mamgain & Mishra, 2010) and IBM Corp., (Northrup, 2003) have been
outsourcing services globally for decades. As reported by Mamgain and Mishra (2010),
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one of GE’s outsourcing initiatives was started by Jack Welch who established an
outsourcing alliance in India for GE’s healthcare business approximately two decades
ago. In its 2002 Annual Report, GE announced its intention of outsourcing $5 billion in
contracts to Chinese vendors by 2005 (GE, 2004). Sending work to offshore locations
became common practice in the late 1990s, when there were shortages in IT skills in both
Europe and North America, particularly those required for fixing Y2K and Euro
conversion programs (Morrison & Macia, 2005). Lewin and Peeters (2006) defined
offshoring as a company practice that relocates a business-related activity to a wholly
owned company or independent service provider in another country, which often incurs
lower costs for the outsourcer. Jain, Kundu, and Niederman (2008) believed that
offshoring can be established through different channels, including:
1.

Creating a subsidiary abroad and transferring work to that new internal
organizational unit,

2. Acquiring a subsidiary in another country,
3. Hiring individual workers in another country directly,
4. Hiring an external service provider that operates in a foreign country, or
5. Contracting with a multi-national service provider with the intention of using their
labor forces abroad (Jain, Kundu, & Niederman, 2008). Among these five distinct
channels of offshoring that Jain et al. mentioned, this dissertation is concerned with
only the last two channels as they are describing services that actually are being
outsourced to external service providers. These two means of relocating production of
goods and services to facilities in other countries have also been called offsourcing
(Lovvorn, Kedia, & Lahiri, 2004). One example of this arrangement is the five-year
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IT management services outsourcing agreement that Atos Origin has with the Belgian
mobile telecommunications providers BASE, which is the wholly owned subsidiary
of KPN (Atos Origin, 2007).
As part of the outsourcing process, approximately 40 BASE employees were
transferred to Atos Origin. Under this agreement, Atos Origin was responsible for the IT
infrastructure, including data center, service desk, security management, and storage. In
the application management area, BASE transferred all applications management
services, including corrective maintenance and third-party management to its service
provider (Atos Origin, 2007). While BASE continued to influence the strategic
orientation of its IT activities, Atos Origin took care of all operational support for BASE.
Because of the documented benefits, such as lower cost of skilled workers (Sattineni,
2007), increased shareholders’ value (Hanna & Daim, 2009), greater focus on core
competencies (Kakumanu & Portanova, 2006), improved process efficiencies and quality,
and the ability to scale operation up and down as needed (Claire, Gupta, & Tarsh, 2010),
many of the fully outsourced contracts ended up operating in locations outside of the
customers’ home location (Hanna & Daim, 2009). This practice, offshore outsourcing,
continues to gain popularity (Kakumanu & Portanova, 2006). As Sattineni (2007) stated,
“back office work such as human resources, accounting, auditing, advertising,
telemarketing and customer relations” (p.1) were among candidates that US corporations
outsourced to vendors in foreign countries.
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APPENDIX B
SURVEY INSTRUMENT
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Demographics
1) Management Level:
Manager ________
Director _______
EVP / Vice President _____
CIO ________
CTO _________
COO ________
CEO _____
Others ___________________

4) Education:
Less than High School _____
High School / GED _____
Some College _____
2-year College Degree _____
4-year College Degree _____
Masters Degree _____
Doctorate Degree _____
Professional Degree (JD, MD) ______

2) Age:
Under 15 _____
15-24 _____
25-34 _____
35-44 _____
45-54 _____
55-64 _____
65 and older _____
3) Gender: Male _____ Female _____

5) Years at Current Position:
Less than 2 _____
2 to 5 _____
6 to 10 _____
11 to 15 _____
16 to 20 _____
More than 20 _____

Control Variables
Question: Which of the following categories does your business fall under?
1. Banking and Finance
2. Manufacturing
3. Information and telecommunication
4. Retail and Wholesale
5. Construction
6. Services
7. Public Administration
8. Agriculture, Forestry, and fishing
9. Others
Question: Please provide approximate details about your organization and yourself:
Total amount of sales volume (as of the previous financial year): (
)
Year when IT outsourcing was first adopted: (
)
Year of the IT outsourcing project that you last managed: (
)
On average, the IT outsourcing project that you have managed takes: (
) months

The following questions were based on a seven-point Likert scale that range from
a value of 1 to 7, as follows:
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Agree

7
Strongly
Agree

Financial commitment in the form of dedicated asset-specific investments
1) You and your vendors have invested in related facility to better serve the needs of both parties.
2) You and your vendors have reengineered relevant business processes to fit the specific requirements
of both parties.
3) You and your vendors have had trained employee assigned to handle that particular relationship only.
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Future business partnership
1)
2)
3)
4)

The parties expect to work together on future projects.
The parties were expected to focus on long-term goals in the relationship.
Our involvement with this contractor is open ended.
We expect this contractor to grow into a lifelong partner.

Calculative trust
1) We cannot leave this service provider because of the amount of money, time, and energy we
have invested in the relationship.
2) Transferring existing IT project to a different vendor would cause my company significant
problems.
3) We maintain our relationship with our vendors because leaving them would mean
significant sacrifices.

Attitudinal commitment
1)
2)
3)
4)

We and our vendor do our best to maintain the relationship.
The relationship between us and our vendor is strengthened.
We and our vendor always try to keep each other’s promises.
We and our vendor are willing to continue the relationship.

Overall managerial perception of IT outsourcing
1) How well your contractors have delivered what they have promised in terms of meeting deadlines
specified in the Service Level Agreement.
2) How well your contractors have delivered what they have promised in terms of providing key activities
such as applications development, software maintenance or infrastructure support, specified in the
Service Level Agreement.
3) How well your contractors have delivered what they have promised in terms of meeting the overall
Service Level Agreement.

Technological capability
1) Our IT team has developed a scheme for IT standardization.
2) Our IT team has the ability to integrate IT.
3) Our IT team understands the trend of IT.

Outsourcing Success
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

We have been able to refocus on core business.
We have enhanced our IT competence.
We have increased access to skilled personnel.
We have enhanced economies of scale in human resources.
We have enhanced economies of scale in technological resources.
We have increased control of IT expenses.
We have reduced the risk of technological obsolescence.
We have increased access to key information technologies.
We are satisfied with our overall benefits from outsourcing.
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APPENDIX C
Reliability and validity information from the questionnaire sources

• The parties expect to work
together on future projects.
• The parties were expected
to focus on long-term
goals in the relationship.
• Our involvement with this
service provider is open
ended.
• We expect to grow into a
long term relationship with
this service provider.

Cronbach’s alpha = 0.805.

Construct
reliability

Item reliability
Item reliability was
conducted by means of
factor loadings of the
construct items.
Factor loading is
significant at 0.01
significance level. The
factor loading for these
questions was in the
range of 0.832 and
0.841.

Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81

• You and this service
provider have invested in a
related facility to better
serve the needs of both
parties.
• You and this service
provider have
reengineered relevant
business processes to fit
the specific requirements
of both parties.
• You and this service
provider have trained
employee assigned to
handle that particular
relationship only.
Future Business
relationship

Tian, Lai, and Daniel (2008)

Asset-specific
investments

Source

Carson, Madhok, and Wu (2006)

Question
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Convergent validity

Discriminant validity

By running a confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) with the
measurement model, fit indexes
suggested an acceptable,
reasonable fit of the model to the
data (normed fit index [NFI] =
0.985; non-normed fit index [NNFI]
= 0.982; comparative fit index [CFI]
= 0.991; root mean square error of
approximation [RMSEA] = 0.064).

Inter-correlations between the constructs were
not very high. By examining the 95 percent
confidence intervals around all possible pair-wise
construct correlations, the construct correlations
range considerably in value from 0.111 to 0.565
suggesting discriminant validity among the
constructs.

RMSEA = 0.03.

By examining the difference in chi-square values
between constrained and unconstrained models,
test statistics for each pair were all highly
significant (p < 0.01), suggesting discriminant
validity.

• We and this service
provider do our best to
maintain the relationship.
• The relationship between
us and this service
provider is strengthened.
• We and this service
provider always try to keep
each other’s promises.
• We and this service
provider are willing to
continue the relationship.

Item reliability

CFA showed a high level of reliability with the ρ index
between 0.76 and 0.90.

Construct
reliability

composite reliability = 0.890

• We cannot leave this
service provider because
of the amount of money,
time, and energy we have
invested in the
relationship.
• Transferring existing IT
project to a different
service provider would
cause my company a lot of
trouble, worry and
problems.
• We maintain our
relationship with this
service provider because
leaving this service
provider would mean
significant sacrifices.
Attitudinal commitment

N'Goala G. (2010)

Calculative trust

Source

Han et al. (2008)

Question
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Convergent validity

Discriminant validity

Average Variance Extracted (AVE)
is greater than 0.50.

Root AVE = 0.72.

AVE = 0.669

Root AVE = 0.82

• Our IT team has
developed a scheme for
IT standardization.
• Our IT team has ability
to integrate IT.
• Our IT team
understands the trend of
IT.

Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90

Construct
reliability

Item reliability
Item loading was
significant at the 0.05
level.

Convergent validity
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Discriminant validity

AVE = 0.833, which was larger
than the cross-correlations with
other constructs.

AVE = 0.570

composite reliability = 0.902

• How well your
contractors have
delivered what they have
promised in terms of
meeting deadlines
specified in the Service
Level Agreement.
• how well your
contractors have
delivered what they have
promised in terms of
providing key activities
such as applications
development, software
maintenance or
infrastructure support,
specified in the Service
Level Agreement.
• how well your
contractors have
delivered what they have
promised in terms of
meeting the overall
Service Level
Agreement.
Technical capabilities

Ho et al. (2003)

Managers’ experience in
outsourcing

Source

Han et al. (2008)

Question

Root AVE = 0.75

• We have been able to
refocus on core business.
• We have enhanced our IT
competence.
• We have increased access
to skilled personnel.
• We have enhanced
economies of scale in
human resources.
• We have enhanced
economies of scale in
technological resources.
• We have increased control
of IS expenses.
• We have reduced the risk
of technological
obsolescence.
• We have increased access
to key information
technologies.
• We are satisfied with our
overall benefits from
outsourcing.

Construct
reliability

Item reliability

Cronbach’s alpha = 0.908

Manager perception of
Outsourcing success

Source
Grover, Cheon, and Teng (1996)

Question
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Convergent validity

Discriminant validity

Convergent validity was evaluated
by measuring the correlation of
each item representing the
construct with the aggregate
measure for that construct less the
focal item. With the correlation
ranging between 0.589 and 0.817,
convergent validity was confirmed.

Factor analysis was used to confirm discriminant
validity when items were load onto single factors
with loadings of greater than 0.50.

